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WINDOW TO SPACE: EXPLORERS AND P IONEERS 
Whil e  most of JPL ' s  res earch and development activities in the 
1940s and 1950s were devoted to terres trial problems , spac e had never 
been far from the mind s of the laboratory ' s sc ientis t s  and engineer s . 
Frank Malina and Mart in Summerfield had calcula ted in 1945 that it was 
possib l e  to build a rocket that would " e scap e earth ' s  atmosphere . "  ln 
1949 the Bumper WAC , a WAC Corporal mount ed on a V-2 , had set an al t itude 
record by a s c ending 250 miles ; i t  had also proved the feasib ility of 
rockets operating in s t ages. Pas s ing the time between test fl ights at 
White Sand s , New Mexico , in 1 95 0 ,  s ome JPL engineers s cribbled back-of-
the-envelope calculat ions that showed it was possible to cluster some 
Loki rocke t s  on a Corporal mis s i l e  and land an empty beer can on the moon. 
Mor e  s er iously and c er: ainly mor e  formally, JPL director William Pickering 
wa·s ac t ive. throughout the 1940s and SOs on the Upper Atmosphere Research 
Panel , wh ich sponsored res earch us ing high-al t itud e sounding rockets.1 
Ear th-orbiting s a t e l l i t e s , who s e  princip l e s  had. been known 
s ince I s aac Newt on, had approached t echnical f easibility with the 
development of rocketry during World War II. Any obj ec t set moving 
out sid e  the ear th in a proper direction and at a proper sp eed will travel 
around the earth in an elliptical orbit, where centrifugal force exactly 
balances the pull of gravity . The fir s t  requ irement for o rb i t ing a 
satellite was a t tain ing the proper s p e ed . Intercont inental missiles 
attained s p e e d s  of about four miles p er s econd and went out into 
.space about 800 miles before falling back to earth. Satellites 
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required a speed of five miles per second. (To escape the earth's 
gravitational field and travel to the moon required an initial speed of 
seven miles per second, planetary flights·only a little more.) Some 
scientists at the RAND Corporation and the Navy had proposed building 
satellites in the late 1940s. By 1954, as the United States initiated 
a crash pr.ogram to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles,and the 
scientific and military uses of satellites became apparent, satellite 
2 proposals neared the hardware stage. 
Scientists won approval for a satellite as a United States 
contribution to the International Geophysical Year coming up in 1957-
19 58. JPL became involved in the venture when the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency and the Off ice of Naval Research sent their proposal 
for the joint effort, Project Orbiter, to Pasadena for review in late 
1954. Orbiter's .first stage would be an uprated Redstone missile. The· 
remaining stages would consist of Lokis, the small solid-propellant 
antiaircraft rockets developed at JPL; the second stage would use 24 
Lokis; the third, six; and the fourth, one Loki and the five-pound 
payload. JPL reviewers recommended against the use of Lokis because 
the fail�re of any. one of the 31 rockets could prevent the satellite 
from attaining orbit. Homer J. Stewart, the Caltech aerodynamics pro-
fessor who also supervised systems analysis at JPL, recommended instead 
that Orbiter use a smalier number of the more powerful and more reliable 
SergeanF rocket motors, scaled down from 31 inches in diameter to six 
inches in diameter. Revised in accordance with Stewart's ideas, the 
3 
Orbiter proposal appeared heade� for smooth sailing in early 1955. 
3 
But Stewart,· ironically, had to preside over the demise of the 
ABMA-ONR-JPL proposal. Stewart chaired the Ad Hoc Committee on Special 
Capabilities, a subgroup of the Department of Defense Guided Missiles 
Committee, which was formed to referee the competition between the 
Orbiter and Vanguard, a dark-horse entry from the Naval Research 
Laboratory. Orbiter's strength lay in its powerful rocket motors and 
proven technology, which made possible a launch by August 1957, and 
probably earlier. Vanguard, by contrast, utilized a smaller rocket, the 
Viking, which was still under development. But the original Vanguard 
proposal demonstrated superior electronics technology, which could return 
more sophisticated scientific data; the original Orbiter had proposed 
only optical tracking. JPL and ONR scrambled to beef up Orbiter's 
tracking and telemetry components, but too late. The committee split 
over differing technical judgments, interservice rivalries, and concern 
for a "peaceful" rocket instead of an adaptation of a military missile --
and one designed by Germans at that. The two Army-designated committee-
men, Stewart and Clifford C. Furnas, c hancellor of the State University 
of New York at Buffalo, strongly supported Orbiter. But the Stewart 
Committee voted six to two in August 1955 to make Vanguard the first 
Aiiierican satellite program. When the Soviet Sputnik upstaged Vanguard 
while Orbite.r waited in the wings, the decision became one of the most 
4 controversial of the space age. 
JPL and the other Orbiter backers chafed under the decision 
and tried repeatedly to get it reversed. The laboratory contributed 
several more sophisticated electronics studies, but Orbiter remained 
moribund. Yet through personal and institutional connections in the 
communications aspects of missilery, JPL remained near the center o f  
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action. Pickering was a member of the Technical Panel for the Earth 
Satellite Program that was organized by the United States IGY. committee 
in October 1955, and he chaired the working group on tracking and 
computation. The JPL director thus found himself ·in the anomalous 
po�ition of promoting a competing technical proposal but organizing 
opera'tional support for Vanguard. 5 
JPL and ABMA found an instit utional outlet for their Orbit er 
'studies. in the Re-Entry Test Vehicle, which, by a circuitous course, 
eventually led to the first American space triumph. ABMA, led by 
Wernher von Braun and Maj or General John B. Medaris, was developing the 
Jupiter, a medium-range ballistic missile that was engaged in a notorious 
competition with the Air Force ' s Thor. To counteract the terrific heat 
the Jupi ter encountered as it reentered the atmosphere at high velocity, 
ABMA planned to use a blunt ablation-type nose cone, in which the 
various layers peeled away dur ing reentry. The Jupiter was extra-
ordinarily similar to Orbiter; in fact, the missile needed only the 
fourth-stage booster rocket and payload to create a satellite. JPL's 
Orbiter electronics propo sals therefore proved readily adaptable to 
the Jupiter program. The laboratory's telemetry could .send data back 
to ground control on the heating effects of the missile during flight, 
and its trac king mechanism made it possib le to recover the nose cone 
at the end of the flight.
6 
The main JPL contribution was Microlock, a phased-locked loop 
tracking system. The innovation in Microlock was its ability to lock to 
a very low-level signal; under ideal conditions it could, lock on a 
signal as low as a milliwatt nearly 6000 miles away. The origins of. 
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Microlock could be traced to some of the early guidance and information 
theory research for the Corporal. Researching the high-frequency 
properties of transistors, JPL engineers discovered they operated well 
but could put out only fifty microwatts. Such low power at first seemed 
to be useless, but paper calculations followed by experiments demon-
strated that, if an appropriate phase-locked receiver were used, the 
signal might be received from as far as 1000 miles in free space trans-
mission. As adapted for the RTV, Microlock would also extract information 
from five minimum-weight telemetry channels. Microlock was an interesting 
example of how advances in hardware sometimes led to a string of 
conc eptual innovations.
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The RTV also incorporated JPL's skills with solid propellant 
motors in the delicate positioning of the upper stages. The eleven 
motors of the second stage were mounted in an annular ring inside a tub, 
the three motors of the third stage fit inside the second stage, and 
the fourth-stage motor and payload sat in the center of . the two outer 
rings. When each stage :ired it broke the shear pins that attached it 
to the previous assembly and let that stage fall back to earth. For 
greater accuracy the upper stages were enclosed in a spinning tub that 
was powered by two battery-driven electric motors. The tub began 
spinning at 550 rpm before takeoff; about 70 seconds into the flight 
the speed gradually increased to about 750 rpm. This procedure elimina-
ted "resonance between the spin frequency and the natural bending 
frequencies of the miss ile , " which increased as the first-stage 
propellants were consumed. The spinning tub imposed sev�re vibration 
and centrifugal force on the second stage. Extensive ground testing 
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under simulated fl ight conditions s howed the motors performed well, but 
small changes in the noz.zle design were necessary. Throughout the 
design of the upper stages highly accurate positioning and balance were 
necessary to curb vibration and de flection .
8 
The lash-up seemed somewhat "Rube Goldbergish," in the words 
of Eisenhower's second science advisor, George Kistiakowsky of Harvard 
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University; but it worked. The first Jupiter C mis sile in the RTV 
series was fired on_ September 20, 1956, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. 
Some Pentagon officials watched nervously because they feared the RTV 
was a ruse for a clandestine satellite launching. The first RTV set• 
records.for American missiles to that point: an altitude of 682 miles 
and a d_istance of 3350 miles . All the test objectives were met. The 
motor demonstrated the desired power, the ae rody namic design worked 
satisfactorily, and the Micr�lock system performed very cl.ose to theory. 
Since the Army was interdicted from attempting a satellite, the fourth 
stage was loaded wi th sandbags. Had the RTV contained a small Sergeant 
* If the nomenclature of Redstone, Jupiter A and C, RTV, Orbiter, and 
Explorer seemed confusing, it was traceable p artly to bureauc ratic 
sleight-of-hand missile riva lry of the mid-1950s. From JPL's stand­
point in space the salient point was that the RTV, Orbiter, and Explorer, 
though sometimes called Jupiter C, all used the Redstone missile plus 
upper stages composed of scaled Sergeant motors. (JPL was also working 
on the radio-inertial guidance system for the MRBM Jupiter, but this 
program was largely separate from the space activities.) The confu,sing 
terminology arose because the Army was anxious to test Jupiter compo­
nents before the missile itself was ready in May 1957. ABMA simply put 
the comp9nents on the smaller Redstone missiles and hung the label 
" Jupiter A" on them because Jupiters had higher priorities for launching 
at Cape Canaveral. The RTV was not a true Jupiter either, but a Redstone 
plus upper stages with Sergeant 111Ptors; the RTV composite vehicle Medad_s 
labeled "Jupiter C." (Medaris, Countdown for Decision, p. 119). 
motor for just a little extra kick, JPL and ABMA would have put a 
satellite in. orbit -- a year before the Soviet Union.9 
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In the second RTV test, May 15, 1957, the missile took an 
erratic course because of a guidance malfunction shortly before the 
fuel cutoff, The nose cone was tracked to its point of impact but 
was not recovered . (The missilemen suspected sharks beat them to the 
cone-. since on some subsequent tests jaws had ripped open the balloons 
that kept the cones afloat.) The third firing, on August 8, 1957, 
succeeded brilliantly. All major systems worked sati sfac torily, and the 
nose cone was recovered at a range of 1160 miles. The ablation-type nose 
cone proved superior to other techniques and was subse quently adopted in 
the other American missiles. The design of the Jupiter had been vali-
dated, and the tests ended with several sets of flight hardware in var-
ious stages of fabrication left over. Indeed, the successful culmination 
of the program appeared to thwart the efforts of ABMA and JPL perso nnel , 
particularly Homer Stewart, who wanted to keep the RTV series going as a 
backup to a Vanguard they expected to·fail. With the RTV terminated, 
ABMA and JPL did the next best thing. Medaris and von Braun put the extra 
hardware in controlled storage, from which it could be mad e flight-ready 
in less than four months for "more spectacular purposes ." JPL Jupiter 
project manager Jack Froehlich assigned the remaining Sergeant scale 
10 motors to long-term life test, which had the same effect . 
As the RTV series concluded in the summer of 1957, JPL found 
itself in a period of self-analysis and frustration. The Sergeant 
missile program was moving along well but more weapons projects were 
unattractive to JPL. Fearing that JPL might become just a "job shop" 
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for the Army, Pickering and Caltech President Lee DeBridge had agreed 
in 1954 that the Sergeant would be the laboratory's last maj or . weapons 
development. The radio-inertial guidance program the laboratory had 
undertaken on Jupiter ranked as a backup to a backup in aninterim 
development. Satellites seeBed the best new direction for JPL. As
Pickering noted in mid-1957, "the whole trend of rocketry is in this 
area." The problem for the Pasa.denans " was to " find the right way to 
b.egin . " That seemed to mean working through the Army, but the Air 
Force's lock on military satellite planning to that point seemed to 
leave the Army with only the marginal activity of reconnaissance satel-
lites limited to tactical uses. Indicative of the uncertainty at the 
laboratory, as late as the summer of 1957 it seemed that primary
attention over the next three years should be given to extending the RTV 
flights . Then, on Friday night, Oc t o b er 4 ,  1957, JPL personnel scattered 
across the country discovered that a red light was orbiting the earth , 
and that its name was Sputnik, Russian for fellow-t ravelei.11 
* * * * * 
Pickering had gone to Washington D . C. five days earlier for 
a week of IGY meetings . On Monday he had.heard a Russian scientist
announce that the USSR would launch a satellite "in the near future," 
as the translator rendered the phrase; but an American scientist who 
knew Russian leaned over to Pickering and whispered, "That's not what 
he said -- he said 'innninent.'" Even so, the JPL director was not 
prepared for what he heard at a party at the Soviet embassr the night 
of October 4. Walter Sullivan, the New York Times science writer, 
bustled into the room and asked him what he knew about the satellite 
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the Russians said they had just launched. It was the first that Pickering 
-- and . probably anyone else in the room, including the Russians -- knew 
about Sputnik. Pickering hurriedly conferred with several other persons, 
including Lloyd Berkner, who hushed the room and proposed a toast. Amid 
successive torrents of celebratory vodka and caviar, Pickering and his 
IGY collea·gues slipped out to the IGY offices a few blocks away. There 
they pieced together what information they could to see whether Sputnik 
really was in orbit, calculated when it would pass over New York, 
relayed : the information to the press, and went to sleep -- only to be 
awakened after an hour when their calculations proved mistaken , and 
they had to recalculate the time of passage and call the press again. 
It was a long night that left indelible impressions. JPL personnel could 
remember years later where they were when they heard the news, what they 
first thought, and what they did, much as other people could recall how 
they felt when they heard of the deaths of presidents or of the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor.1
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The night of Spuonik I von Braun and Medaris were chatting 
with the new secretary of defense, Neil McElroy, who by coincidence was 
visiting Huntsville. "Vanguard will never make it," cried von Braun. 
"We have the hardware on the shelf. For God's sake turn us l .oose and 
let us do something. We can put up a satellite in sixty days, 
Mr. McElroy! Just give us a green light and sixty days"' As von Braun 
kept repeating "sixty days, " Medaris cautioned: "No, Wernher, ninety 
days." McElroy returned to Washington noncommital.13 
The Eisenhower administration took the news of Spt}tnik in 
stride.: At his first meeting to consider a response to the Russian 
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satellite, on October 9, the president asked Quarles if it was correct 
that the United States could have orbited a satellite more than a year 
earlier by using a Redstone. Quarles said yes.- But Vanguard had two 
advantages, he continued. It stressed the "peaceful character of the 
effort" and it avoided "the inclusion of material, to which foreign 
scientists might be given access, which is used in our own military 
rockets." The Army still felt it could launch a satellite within four 
, months, a month earlier than Vanguard. Eisenhower demurred. The need 
for military classification of the rocket still impressed him. The 
satellite had been tied to the IGY and had never been a crash program, 
he recalled. "To make a sudden shift in our approach now would be to 
belie the attitude we have had all along," he pointed out. The adminis-
tration soon agreed to advance Vanguard's first launch date, and on 
October 31 the general cautiously accepted McElroy's suggestion to use 
the Army backup to Vanguard . Eisenhower also beefed up his science 
advisory system by appointing his first advisor on science and technology, 
James R. Ki ll ian, Jr., pr esident of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. On November 8 Eisenhower delivered a nationally televised 
address designed to reassure citizens that their security was not 
endangered and that the presumed humiliation of Sputnik was only tempor­
ary. Among his props was the recovered nose cone from the ABMA-JPL 
Re-entry Test Vehicle.
14 
Public opinion showed a mixture of alarm and concern, apathy 
and calm. But in Congress, the military, and the scientific and tech­
nical communities a storm of recrimination was breaking. "We do not 
have as much time as we did after Pearl Harbor," said Senator Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Democrat of Texas. The hysteria over Sputnik represented 
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varying proportions of wounded pride, a domestic political weapon, a 
genuine international challenge, and an opportunity for promoting 
institutions' projects of self-interest. Brig. Gen. Homer Boushey, 
who had piloted the plane bearing the first JPL JATOs in 1940, and 
was now deputy director of Air Force research and development, 
warned: · "Who controls the moon controls the earth." Pickering remarked 
sourly: "It is pretty obvious that very few people in this country had 
any appreciation of the political significance of the Russian satellite," 
and that included the politicians "in a pos ition to make decisions." 
It was an "obvious fact" 'that the Russians were "well ahead " in weapons 
technology, he continued. To "recover national prestige" the United 
States did not need dramatic scientific breakthroughs but "good manage­
ment and good engineering on programs which already exist." Not 
coincidentally, this meant using the capabilities of ABMA and JPL on 
Jupiter, and perhaps on a more daring attempt to leapfrog the Russians.
15 
The laboratory staff hastily drew up Project Red Socks, a plan 
to launch nine rockets to the moon in great haste. The laboratory used 
the full cachet of its parent in the proposal, dated October 25, 1957: 
"The California Institute of Technology believes that ic is essential for 
the United States to initiate an immediate program for the scientific 
exploration of the moon." Sputnik implied the Russians could semi 
flights to the moon, said the proposal. "National interest appears to 
require the United States to demonstrate as soon as possible that U.S. 
science likewise has this capability." The first rocket, which would 
use the RTV hardware, would be scheduled for June 1958 and send 15 
pounds around the moon. The remaining eight flights would consist of 
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scaled-up RTV equ ipment and send 120-pound payloads to the moon f r om 
January 1959 through the end o f  1960. The firs t f l ight would ,carry 
instruments to measure temperature, pressure, and light intensity . 
The remaining f l ights would expand on these experiments, and the last 
several rounds might incorporate mor e  sophist i c a t ed guidan c e  to refin e  
the orbit around the moon. In the quest for sp ec t acular sc ienc e , JPL 
officials flirted with even bo lder id�as . Pickering and o ther sc ient ists 
toyed with the idea of exploding an a t omic b omb on the lunar surfac e ,  
wh ich would "shower the earth with samp les o f  sur fac e dust in add it ion 
to producing beneficial psycholo gical results .1116 
These schemes s eemed audacious, even b izarre , f o r  a space 
program tha t  had yet to get o ff the ground. Pickering and DuBr idg e
peddled the Red Socks proposal thro ugh the c o r r idors o f  the Pentagon . 
Lieutenant General James Gavin, head o f  Army research and d evelopment , 
liked it immensely and told the Cal i fornians he would c onsid er its
apprpval the crowning achievement o f  his career . Donald Quarles , 
assistant secretary of defense for research and development , seemed 
interested, but he wanted to invo lve the Air Force. Back in the corridor. 
Pickering turned to DuBridge and said, "Well ,  that kills that." Red 
Socks never got into the race.17 
Through October and November , however, the press ure built for 
Jupiter. A few days after.Sputnik I, the audac ious Medar is told the 
crews at ABMA to take the RTV hardwar e out o f  stora g e  and beg in readying 
it for launch . Med aris lacked higher authority for this actio n; in fact 
he issued his ins truc t ions at the same time the p r esident reaffirmed his 
in tention to stick with the nonmi l it ary approa ch . Medaris f igured the 
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amount o f  money was rela t ively smal l  and that h e  could bury it somewhere, 
if necessary. He was banking , t o o , on the long-held c onvic tion in 
Army-JPL circles that Vanguard would falter . The Soviet Union b o lst ered 
his plans when , on November 3, it orbited Sputnik II with a drama t i c
payload: 1100 pounds in we ight and a live dog, Laika . On November 8 
the Department of Defense at last gave the Army and JPL authorization to 
prepare their sat el l i t e . Explorer, as Orb i t er was now known , r emained 
a backup but it was the moment the two agenc ies had sought sin c e  1954. 
Then, on the n ight o f  November 20 Vanguard was read.ied for 
take-o f f , was f ired , exploded , and sa t b urn ing on its launch pad 
in the'. flat glare o f  int ernational publicity .  Orb i t er '  s moment 
had arrived. 
When von Braun blur t ed to McElroy that the hardware was on the
shel f  he was corr e c t  except for one d e tail: the satellite itself had 
yet to be built. Von Braun confidently assumed his team would get that 
plum ,  but Picker ing was determined to shake it f r e e  for JPL. Th e 
laboratory had earned the job because of its work on Orbiter and the RTV, 
and the p ayload l o g ically f i t  with JPL's communications work, particularly 
Mic r o lock . Just prior to the meet ing at which the roles would be 
assigned , Pickering asked Medaris for.  a f ew minut es alone . He argued 
that JPL should build the satell i te; Medaris agreed . The general 
probably felt the laboratory could handle the electronics work better 
than Redstone , and he wanted to keep JPL a c t ively in the Army's orb i t . 
Von Braun's jaw dropp ed when Medaris and Pickering walked into the 
meet ing and inf o rmed them of the d ecision , but the co l laborat ion proved 
fruitful and there was more than enough work for both teams . The quarter 
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of an hour Pickering spent with Medaris was momentous. If Redstone 
had built the Explorer I �atellite, it would have had a lock on both 
the missile and the satellite. JPL would have been relegated to a 
minor supporting role, chiefly in its tracking network, from which it 
would have been highly unlikely to develop into a major space laboratory. 
Electronics, which had begun s·houldering propulsion aside as the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory's dominant acttvity during the Corporal weaponi-
zation, opened a window to space for JPL.19 
Laboratory personnel worked intensively on what was code-named 
at JPL "Project Deal." Project manager Jack Froehlich, a formidable 
poker player, had bestowed the name in the aftermath of the Sputniks 
wi_t:h the remark: "When a big pot is won, the winner sits around and 
cracks bad jokes and the loser cries, 'Deal!"' The next round was coming 
up even sooner than the ninety days Medaris had promised, for scheduling 
conflicts at the Cape dictated that the vehicle be ready for launching 
by January 29, 1958, just eighty days after the go-ahead. Although 
Vanguard had promised a twenty-five-pound payload, JPL more cautiously 
elected to limit theirs to twenty pounds. The payload structure weighed 
30.8 pounds , including j ust 18 pounds for the instrument compartment. 
Three relatively simple experiments were chosen to investigate the 
satellite's environment, about which little was known. The first two, 
although having some scientific merit, were designed primarily to 
furnish information for future satellite design. The first experiment 
tested the extreme temperatures the satellite would encounter as it 
passed from full sunlight to the complete shade of the earth. A 
thermistor measured the int·ernal temperature of the high-power transmittEX 
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and the satellite's skin temperature. Resistance thermometers performed 
a second skin measurement as well as one of the nose cones. The second 
experiment measured the impact of micrometeorites on the satellite's 
surface by means of an impact microphone, an amplifier, and a circuit 
of eleven wire grids. The third experiment was primarily scientific 
and resulted in the most dramatic findings of the early satellite 
programs. This was the cosmic-ray experiment of James Van Allen of 
the State University of Iowa and involved placing a Geiger-Mueller 
counter and associated equipme�t in the satellite to measure radiation. 
Originally programmed for· Vanguard, the Van Allen experiments .were 
added to Explorer at Pickering's suggestion.
20 
JPL's work on Explorer was relatively straightforward, and 
surprisingly informal. Two considerations -- shape and temperature --
were among the main design constraints in designing the fourth stage. 
At first JPL engineers considered but rejected a spherical shape. A 
sphere probably could not be made rugged enough to survive launching 
through the atmosphere without either adding too much weight for strength-
ening or adding .a protective cone. A cylindrical shape seemed preferable. 
This shape was consistent with the last stage rocket motor and·with the 
instrumentation to be carried. The final stage measured eighty inches 
long and six inches in diameter. The easiest and most reliable way to 
counteract the extremes suggested extensive insulation and a careful 
ratio of bare steel, which provided a relatively high temperature, and 
aluminum exide, which furnished a low temperature.
21 
Two typical JPL approaches to design characterized the design 
and fabrication. First, simple, reliable components were used instead 
\. 
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of more complicated designs which might have yielded higher performance 
but presented more design risks. The booster stages, for ins.tanc e , used 
the relatively small six-inch scale Sergeant motors. These units had 
undergone more than 300 static t ests ,  50 flight t ests , and 2 9 0  ignition­
system firings without a failure. Second, the laboratory used to the 
maximum the exp er ienc e its engineers had derived from the minut e  details 
of manufacturing. For instance, it was very difficult to determine 
malalignment of the components because the simple methods of measurement 
were less accurate than the malalignment itself. JPL engineers thus 
pr ecalculated the malalignment o f  all components "with only experience 
as a guide"; this made po s s ib l e  f ield assembly of the large rotating 
second stage with a malalignment o f  less than 1 / 1000 of an inch. In 
another case a structural engineer checked the strength o f  a motor c ase
by standing on it unt il it was deformed the maximum amount and observing 
that it suffered no apparent ill effects; these informal findings were
later confirmed by sophisticated spin tests. Such techn iques had
contributed to JPL's problems in preparing drawings and insuring 
repro ducibility when dealing with contractors in its missile programs, 
but for producing a limited ed it ion prototype under severe time 
. 2 2pressure experience proved a trustworthy guide . 
Third, dual or tri.ple systems were used wherever possible so 
that a malfunction would not endanger a system or the entire mission. 
The igniter, for instance, might have to be fired in a vacuum; i t s  
failure would abort the mission. Three safeguards were employed: the 
i gn i t e r  was des igned to fire in a vacuum, the motor was sealed to hold 
atmospheric pressure, and the igniter was sealed in a container holding 
atmos pheric pressure. The last two c onsiderat ions added slightly to
17 
the weight, but the added wei ght pur chased much greater reliab ility a t  
low cost . The concep t o f  dual or t riple systems , known as "redundancy , 1' 
c ame to play a vital ro le in spac e missions.23 
Besides work on the Explorer i tself , JPL had to quickly expand 
the tracking network. Two pr imary Microlock stat ions already exi s t ed 
from p revious experiments, Earthquake Valley near San Diego , California , 
and Air Fo rce Missile Test Center in F lorida . JPL designed e qu ipment
for new stat ions , which wer e set up in Nig eria and Singapore in coopera­
t ion with the British IGY committee. These stat ions were to snare 
telemetry data from the exper iments. The orbital calculations .would be 
handled through th� Florida and Cal ifornia stat ions , and since Exp lorer I 
was launched eastward , an hour and forty-five minu t es would elapse 
before conf irmat ion of orbit would be possible.24 
By early January JPL had f inished its booster stages and
sat ellite and moved them to Cape Canaveral und er extraordinary secrecy . 
After the Vanguard failure the Army had clamped maximum security 
restr i c t ions around Exp lorer , which was known even in highly c lassified
c ab l es between Redstone and JPL as "Missile 2 9 . "  Medar is wanted to 
make the p r eparat ions for launch app ear to b e  j ust ano ther Redstone 
missile t est . Any JPL p ersonnel who could be obviously re lated to a 
sat e l l i t e  launch , particularly project director Jack Froehlich, moved 
under elaborate decoy plans . Secrecy during the erection o f  the 
missile and mating o f  the upper stages was part icularly sens i t ive. The 
upper s t ages were t o  b e  c over ed with canvas for the hurr ied pr edawn 
movement to the launch pad. Then the launching structur e was brought 
up and the b ird cages surrounded the missile so that the top sec t ion
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was not visible �way from the l aunching ar ea . Missil e 29 could then 
be "identified as a Redstone s ince the par t  in view wil l  app ear the 
s ame as a standard Redstone booster." Medaris warned: "I cannot 
overemphasize the importance of these decoy plans and the abso lute 
nec ess ity of covering this launch ing as a normal test of a Redstone 
missil e, and I d esir e well understood tha t  the individual who viol ates 
these ins t ructions will be hand l ed severely.1125 
The preparations moved smoothly and by January 29 Missile 29 
sat r eady for countdown . The secr ecy had to end somewher e , of course, 
and by then a crowd of VIPs and newsmen had journeyed to the cape , but 
under an agreement by which no news was r el eased until after the launch.
Missile 29 perched on the pad for two days while f l i ght personnel con-
sul t ed weather forecasts a s anxiously as General Eisenhower befor e  D-Day, 
On the 29th and 30th high winds from the jet stream forced postponement; 
the engineers feared the missile could no t s tand the f o r c e. But on the 
31st the winds, while still strong, subsided enough to justify the 
risk. The count down proceeded normally and was only twenty- f ive minu t e s
behind schedule. At JPL engineer s clustered around the teletype hookup 
to the cape and watched anxiously as a nervous o p erator t apped out the 
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events of the· last minute of counting: 
X-1 At'lD COUNTING 
2247EST 
K 
NO TL."IB WILL BE GIVEN FROM HERE ON IN 
19 
4 5  SECONDS 
20 
15 
10 
9S 
7 
654 3 2 1 
BAST OFF 
PROGRAM STARTED 
LIFT OFF 
Inside the blockhouse at the cape , M edaris l is tened int ently 
to the princ ipal ind icator that the rocket was c limbing steadily: a 
whining signal transmitted from the nose cone. Theri it stopped. "I 've 
lost my signal!" cried Medaris . A s i gnal going d ead usually meant 
missile fa ilur e . "Oh, oh • • •  Too bad • • This d o e sn't look good," 
murmured crewmen. An army cap tain ran to a phone , dialed the central 
recording s t a t ion. "Signal lost at the blockhous e . How's yours ?" 
The reply: "Noisy but l egible . "  After forty anxious seconds of seeming 
failur e ,  the crowd pressed into the blockhouse was reassured.
STILL GOING AT ONE MIN NOW 
STILL GOOD 
90 SECONDS 
GOT THROUGHT THE JET STREAMS 
EVERY THING NORMAL LOOKS GLO X  GOOD 
110 SECOND NOW 115 
20 
R
l40 SECONDS 
145 
APPROACHING BURN OU'r27 
After 155 seconds the first-stage rocket burned out and fell 
into the Atlantic. As.the vehicle coasted upward past 200 miles the 
guidance system tilted the assembly into a horizontal path. At 225 
miles and 403.7 seconds, when the missile's position paralleled the 
surface of earth, a ground signal ignited the second and third stages, 
The velocity increased quickly, from 5520 miles per hour to 17,680 miles 
per hour. After 428.6 s econds of flight -- nine more than predicted 
Explorer I reached an altitude of 228 miles, ten miles higher than• 
forecas�. The fourth stage rocket ignited and gave the final stage a 
kick that should have sent the satellite into orbit. At the Pentagon, 
wher� another watch party was going on, von Braun turned to Pickering 
and said, "It's yours now." JPL took control. "Right, it's ours now, " 
'd P" k 1 28 sai. i.c er .ng. 
The.Associated Press moved a story from the cape: 
THE ARi.'1Y'S JUPITER-C MISSILE BLASTED OFF FRIDAY 
NIGHT, CARRYING A SATELLITE INTO SPACE. ARMY 
OFFIC.IALS SAID IT WOULD NOT BE KNOWN FOR ABOUT TWO 
HOURS WHETHER THE MISSILE HAD SUCCEEDED IN PROPELLING 
THE FIR ST AMERICAN ' MOON ' I�TO ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH. 
JPL personnel in Pasadena felt helpless. There was nothing to do but 
wait and be poised to pick up Explorer's signal, if it was in orbit. 
GEN MEDARIS SAID HAVE A CUP OF COFFEE - SMOKE A CIGARETT SWEAT IT OUT 
WITH US 
K 
OK TNX LXX ALOT DAY WILL DO 
K 
DE JPL 
WE.ARE BEING NONCHALANT AND LIGHTING UP A MARJAUNA 
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The laboratory crews.were anything but relaxed . 
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At the cape 
Medaris and other officials kept popping into the JPL data analysis 
room for assurances Explorer was in orbit. Froehlich, Stewart, Al Hibbs , 
and other laboratory personnel were poring over the telemetry from the 
down-range stations, in order to send their West Coast colleagues a 
prediction of when the bird should pass. The velocity seemed adequate 
for orbit, they knew, but they had no data on the angle of inc lination . 
"The thing could be pointing up too high or pointing down so low from 
the horizontal that it would have been a disastrous launching," Stewart 
recalled. As best they could figure, Explorer should pass within 
about 105 minutes, or certainly by 1 10 minutes. But Explorer did not 
show. Seven minutes late; e�eryone throughout the organization was 
"really getting pretty upset ." Eight minutes late. Finally the San 
Gabriel Valley Radio Amateur Club near Pasadena, followed quickly . by 
The the Earthquake Valley Microlock sta tion, picked up the signal. 
satellite was late because the jet stream had g iven it an extra kick 
of about 100 feet per second, which sent it into an orbit with a higher 
peak, and hence longer transit time, than JPL trackers had thought 
possible. When injected into orbit the object enjoyed ample margin for 
error; its position was only about 0.8 degrees from the horizontal, 
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b u t  a s_a t is factory orb i t  would have b een p os s ib l e  with a d evia t ion a s  
great as 4 degree s . Exp lorer I ' s apogee was 1580 miles , i t s  perigree
223 miles , and the t ime f o r  one orbit 1 1 3 . 2  minut e s . Explorer I wa s  in 
orbit , and JPL was j ub ilant . 30 
When the Micro lock snatched the s ignal from spac e ,  it also 
turned the internat ional l imel ight on JPL . No longer an o b s cure Army 
laboratoty known chiefly t o  mis s il e  c o gno s c ent i ,  JPL basked happ ily 
in the warm glow of favorab le pub l icity . P icker ing , Van Allen , and 
von Braun ho i s t ed a mod el o f  the Explorer I s a t e l l i t e  over their heads 
at a Was h in g t o n  news conference the next day , and a wire-s ervice 
pho to graph of the occas ion appeared in hundreds of Amer ic an newspap ers . 
Th e N ew Yo rk T imes ran a s idebar on the laboratory , and T ime includ ed 
a p r o f i.l e of P i ckering with t ho s e  of Med aris and von Braun . Mo s t  o f  the 
a t t en t ion f o c u s ed on von Braun and his c o l l eagues ; preo ccupat ion with
the inore dramat·ic and mo r e  e a s i ly und e r s t ood rocket boo s t er , and with
the h�man- int er e s t  s t ory of the f o rmer Germans working for Amer ica , Wci S 
p erhaps und ers t andable . No mat t er . JPL was bur s t ing with p r id e , and 
already dreaming o f  a maj or r o l e  in spac e exp lorat ion . In tr iumph , and 
in d e f e a t , JPL would no t r e t urn to its  f o rmer ob scurity . 3 1
* * * * * 
JPL and ABMA cont inued to col laborate on a s eries o f  Explore rs 
through July 1 9 5 8 . Th ey were d e s igned to exa c t  quickly the maximum 
mil eage f r om exi s t in g  technology , and they focused on the intr iguing 
co smic ray data r eturned from Explorer I. While b a s ically s imilar to 
the fir st s a t e l l it e ,  they introduced s ome r e f inemen t s  in the payload . 
Exp lorer II , launched on March 5 ,  1 9 5 8 , did no t achieve orbit when , 
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because o f  a s t ructural failur e , the fourth s tage failed to ignite . 
Explorer I I I  p l ac ed the s econd suc c e s s ful Amer ican sat e l l i t e  into orbit 
on March 2 6 , 1 9 5 8 . Met eorite and t emp erature measuremen t s  r e s emb led 
tho s e  on Exp lorer I .  The maj or innovation was a t ape recorder that 
mad e i t  p o s s ib l e  t o  transmit much fuller co smic-ray data . Becau s e  o f  
the small number o f  t racking s t a t ions , much o f  the orbit could no t b e  
ob s e rved ; j us t  a s  this had c aus ed an anx ious two hours o n  January 31 , 
it a l s o  meant that much of the t e l emetered data was lo s t . Explorer I I I
contained a miniature tape recorder . Moving at a very s low r a t e  o f  
. 00.5 inches per s econd , the recorder need ed les s than thr ee f ee t  o f  t ape
to freeze the data f rom an ent ire orb i t . When the satellite  neared a 
tracking s t a t ion , a ground s i gnal swi t ched on the playba_ck head and 
the high-power transmi t t er . In l e s s  than f ive s econds all the d a t a
. 3 2from the orb it was s en t , and the tape was erased and r e s e t . 
The returns from Exp lorer III con t inu ed to as t ound s cientists . 
Pul s e  rates at the apo gee o f  the orbit regist ered at leas t a tho u s and 
t imes wha t had been expe c t ed ; coun t s  exc e eded 3 5 , 000 p e r  s econd at 
the high e s t  alt itudes , over �outh America , and sa turat ed the Gei ger-
Mueller c ounter . The data from Explo r er s I and III enab led Van Al l en 
to announc e on May 1 ,  1 9 5 8 , the d i s c overy o f  "a very great int ens ity o f
rad iat ion about alt itudes o f  some 5 0 0  mil e s  over 34  d e g r e e s  north and 
s outh of the equator . "  He theorized that thes e phenomena , u l t imat e ly 
known as the Van Allen b e l t s , cons i s t ed o f  charged p ar t icles trapped 
in the earth ' s  magnet i c  f ie ld . 3 3
Thes e  extrao rdinary f indings l e d  JPL , ABMA , and IGY s c i ent i s t s  
to d evote Explorer I V  entirely to radia t ion s tud ies , i n  conj unct ion with
the novel Argus exper iment . The s atellite was launched suc ces s fully on 
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July 2 6 , 1 9 5 8 , and carried almo s t  twi c e  t h e  weight o f  ins trumentat ion 
of the p r evious vehicles . Van Allen d eveloped new ins trument s tha t 
could rec ord 6 0 , 0 0 0 par t i c l e s  p er s quare c ent imet er per s econd , s everal 
thous and t imes that p r evious ly measured . Explorer IV recorded data 
from areas not s amp l ed p r evious ly . Its pred ecessors had ranged b e tween 
35 d e grees north and s outh lat itud e ; Exp l o r er IV covered mo s t  of the 
Earth ' s  sur f ac e , with extr emi t i e s  at 5 1 degrees . The Argus exper iment 
p rovid ed data never pres ent b e f o r e . In lat e Augu s t  and S e p t emb er the 
Navy s ent three rockets to an alt itude o f  3 0 0  mil e s  over the South 
At lant ic , where small atomic bomb s  were exploded in brill iant pyro- · 
t echnio· d is p l ay s . Explorer IV ' s  ins truments recorded the radiat ion 
from the explos ions that was trapped in the atmo s phere and made p o s s ib l e  
cons iderab l e  ref inement o f  the knowledge o f  t h e  Van Allen b e l t s  and 
related phenomena . Explorer V failed to achieve orbit . !he radiat ion 
exp erimen t s  of the three s u c c e s s ful Exp lorers. had s cored a s c i ent i f ic 
coup with wha t .Van Al len ap t ly t ermed " the mo s t  int eres t ing and least 
3 4 exp e c t ed r e s u l t s "  o f  the probes . 
T h e  las t maj or phas e o f  the pro gram to adapt exi s t ing t ech-
nology to quick and easy proj ect s  bore fruit in P ioneers III and IV . 
The s e  ventur e s  were e s s e�t ially· s impl i f ied r evis ions o f  the ill f a t ed 
Red S o cks proposal . ,ABMA sub s t ituted a mod i f ied Jup it er.-C mis s il e , 
which d eveloped 15 0 , 0 0 0  pound s o f  thrus t ,  for the 7 8 , 00 0 -p ound -thrus t 
Red s tone . JPL ' s  three sp innin g upper propul s ion s tages r emained 
bas ically the s ame . The p ayload contained the f amil iar t emp erature 
sensors and Geiger-Mueller count e r s ; the laboratory add ed a shutter-
tr igger mechanism that was suppo s ed to b e  tr ipp ed by the r e f l e c t ed 
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l i ght o f  the moo n .  T h e  12 . 9 5 p ound s o f  ins truments were housed under a 
s t r ip ed conical hat tha t somewhat r e s embled the c anopy of a merry-go-
. 3 5round . 
Two P ioneer s , d e s i gned by the Air Force and Space Techno l o gy 
Laboratories , preceded the JPL-ABMA comb inat ion in the fall o f  1 9 5 8 . 
Neither worked , and the laboratory and the. Army again had a chance t o
ap s tag e· a r ival s ervic e .  .Pioneer I I I  was laun<;hed from Cap e Canaveral 
on December 6 ,  1 9 5 8 , but i t  d id not achieve escape velo c ity when the 
f ir s t  s t age cut o f f  p r ematurely . The payload r o s e  to a height o f  
6 3 , 5 0 0  miles , about 7 , 00 0  miles sho r t  o f  the previous P ioneer . N ever-
theles s ,  two o f  the f light obj e c t ives were part ially met ; the new 
Golds t one stat ion tracked the probe without a hitch , and the radiat ion 
count ers returned fur ther r e f inement·s of data on the Van Allen belt s . 
' Be f o r e  JPL-ABMA had a chanc e to try again , the S oviet Union 
s ent Luna I toward the mo on on January 2 ,  1 9 5 9 . Later renamed Mechta , 
or "Dream , "  Luna I pas s ed within 3 , 7 2 8  miles o f  the mo on ' s  sur face and 
pas s ed on into orbit around the sun -- the f i r s t  vehicle t o ·  escap e  
Earth ' s  gravitat ional attract ion . The f l ight o f  P ioneer IV , launched 
on March 3 ,  1 9 5 9 , ther e f o r e  s e emed ant iclimac t ic , , al though it was by 
far the mos t  succes s ful of the P ioneer s e r i e s . The probe pas s ed 
within 3 7 , 2 0 0  miles o f  the moon 4 1- 1 / 2 hours a f t er inj e c t ion . 
The l ight mechanism s t ayed dark becaus e it had been 
p r o grammed to o p erat e when P ioneer c ame within 2 0 , 0 0 0  mil e s  o f  the moon . 
. Th e  tracking sys t em worked superbly , however , and received �ioneer ' s
signals unt il the spacecraft ' s bat t eries failed about 4 0 7 , 00 0  miles
from Earth . Pioneer IV f o llowed Luna I into o rb i t  around the sun , 
3 7  becoming a pl anet t h a t  c omp l e t ed a c ircui t every 3 9 5  d ays . 
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Pioneer I V  au gmen t ed JPL ' s  s en s e  o f  accomp l ishment and feeling 
o f  superiority ; the labo r a t o ry and the Army had again b e s t ed its
American r ival s .  Has t i ly mod i f ied exi s t in g  techno logy had put the 
Un i t ed S t a t e s  on the board in the space d erby . But the Soviet succes s e s  
cont inued t o  rankl e  and enc ouraged JPL o f f i c ials t o  p r e s s  f o r  a more 
vigorous s p ac e pro gram . Mod i f ic a t ion s of �xi s t ing t echno lo gy had 
' reached their limits . ·  JPL engine er s had recogniz ed ear ly in 1 9 5 8  
that the Juno I and I I  s er i e s  repr es ent ed a s t r ing o f  improvis a t ions
useful for the moment , p erhap s , but not a� all what they b e l i eved a 
cred ible United St a t es spac e program d emanded . The laborat o ry ' s 
ambition for int erna t i onal l ead ership in the space program had already . 
been trans lat ed int o a dynamic , abras ive pre s ence in a new civilian 
s p a c e  a g ency and an amb it ious space p ro gram . 
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ORGAN I Z ING FOR SPACE , 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 0  
T h e  Jet Propuls ion Laboratory b rought to the space pro gram a 
her itage of reach ing for b i g  problems . In b o th propuls ion and communi­
c a t ions JPL had a imed at the maj or problems in the f ield ins t ead o f  
mer ely r e f inement s  in exis t ing knowledge . From the ear l i e s t  days o f  
space int erest the labora tory f e l t  t h e  lure o f  deep space , part icularly 
p l ane t ary explo rat ion . John Smal l ,  a s enior engineer at the laboratory , 
once exp l ained the JPL ethos as want in g " t o  do the f inal far-out 
t h ing s . "  JPL would rather go t o  Sa turn ' s  rings than und er s tand the
Mart ian sur f ac e , make the l i f e  mea suremen t on a p lanet than land a 
capsule , and l and a c a p s u l e  than build the s pacecra f t . JPL ' s  earl i e s t
s p a c e  pl,anning c a lled f o r  fligh t s  t o  Mar s a s  early as t h e  f a l l  o f  1 9 6 0 . 
But reaching for the " f inal far-out things " also invo lved a d e t e rmina-
t ion of the ro l e  the lab o r a t o ry would play in mor e  mundane mat t er s , 
s uch as the p r o p u l s ion vehi c l e . And the path to deep space required
sure fo o t in g  in the p o l i t ical ma z e s  on Earth . 1  
The laboratory at f i r s t  cont inued its f amil iar all ianc e with 
the Army B al l i s t ic Mis s il e  Agency . The two or ganizat ions ' r e s earch and 
d evelopment areas c omy l emented each o ther , and Wernher von Braun ' s
overp ower ing int e r e s t  in b u i l d ing a g iant b oo s t er rocket dove t ailed 
with JPL ' s  deep s pace int eres t .  ABMA ' s  amb i t ions were no thin g  s ho r t  o f  
b reathtaking ; a p l an it put together early in 1958 contended a four -man 
2 
exp er imental space s t a t ion was feas ib l e  by 1 9 6 2 , a manned lunar 
exped it ion by mid-196 6 , a permanent moon b a s e  by 1 9 7 3 , and the f i r s t  
manned exped it ion to a p lane t  by 1 9 7 7 . The f i r s t  s t e p  was the need 
for a mor e  advanced veh i c l e  than the Juno I I , which p owered the P ioneer 
f ligh t s . Juno III , which they propo sed in March 1 9 5 8 , would cons is t 
o f  a Jup iter and high-speed upper s tages s imilar to Juno II but o f
greater capac ity . Medar i s  p r op o s ed that b y  s p r ing o f  1 9 5 9  a Juno I I I
witp a 1 2 0-pound payload could swing past t h e  mo on at a d i s tance o f 
5 , 00 0  to 10 , 000 miles and phot o graph the back s id e , h ereto fore never 
s e en by man ; by lat e 1 9 5 9  a Juno III could manage a hard land ing with 
an ins trumented payload on the lunar surfac e . (Medar i s ' t imetab l e  was 
hopeles s ly opt-imi s t ic . The f i r s t  Unit ed S t at es spac ecraft to achieve 
a hard land ing on the moon would b e  Ranger in 1964, and the Soviet 
Union would eas ily beat America c ameras t o  th e back s ide . )  Juno I I I  
had no s ooner b e en propo sed than JPL expres s ed second thought s .  
Juno I I I  fell b e tween two s to o l s : It was t o o  b i g  f o r  minimum probes , 
which Juno II c ould hand l e , but no t b i g  enough for mo r e  advanced mis s ions
that would be guid ed and ful ly ins trumen t ed ; the s imp l icity of the 
s pinn ing c lu s t er was l o s t  when the ro t a t ion had t o  be s t op p ed to apply 
accurat e  f inal s t age s peed or direct ion contro ls . Juno III was thus a 
" c l o s ed-end d evelopmen t "  that was "no t really compatible with the 
exp e c t ed course of d evelopmen t s  in the guid anc e field . " 2 
Juno I I I  had b e en d evised to meet a Department o f  D e f en s e  
reques t  for r eadily availab l e  t echno logy for m i l i t ary s a t e l l i t e s . 
JPI. soon conc lud ed , however , that it wanted to push b eyond exis t ing 
technology and deeper int o  space . It was t ime , the laboratory ar gued 
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in April 1 9 5 8 , to emb ark on a "really int egrated propul s ion s y s t em with 
growth p o t ent ial and broad 'us e fulne s s  in o ther programs . "  The bas is o f
t h i s  departure , b i lled a s  Juno IV , would b e  the famil iar Jupiter . In 
place of the three unguid ed , s o l id-propellant upper s t a g es of Junos I-
III , however , Juno IV would u s e  two more powe r fu l and mor e  sophist icated 
guided , l iquid-prop e l l e d  upp e r  s t ages . JPL argued that it should have 
r e s p ons ib il i ty for b o t h  the 4 5 , 0 0 0-pound -thrus t s ec ond s t a g e  and the 
6 , 0 00-pound third s tage . The laboratory ins i s t ed , mo reover , that it 
exerc i s e re s pons ib i l ity f o r  space mis s ions . ABMA would cont inue d evelop-
ment of Jup i t e r  and exer c i s e  respon s ib il ity for s a t e l l i t e s  and lunar 
probes . The Army at f i r s t  d emurred but then accepted JPL ' s  amb i t ions . 3 
But the f a t e  o f the Juno IV proposal at the hand s o f  higher 
autho r i t y  in Au gus t  1 9 5 8  alarmed JPL . The E is enhower adminis trat ion 
had es t ab l i. shed the Advanc ed Res earch Proj e c t s  Agency in the Depar tment 
of D e f ens e in February 1 9 5 8  to handl e  the military space program and 
to ac t as a care t aker for any even t ual c ivil ian s p a c e  proj e c t s . ARPA ' s  
main int er e s t  in 1 9 5 8  lay in reconna i s s ance s a t e l l i t e s ; lunar proj e c t s  
were s ec ondary ; and d eep s pace w a s  too remo t e  for ARPA t o  c on t emp l a t e  
j us t  then . ARPA approved JPL ' s  propo s a l s  for an imp roved tracking 
sys t em ,  b as ed o n  the new Gold s tone s tation , which could grow eventually 
into a deep s p a c e  t racking facil ity . But the agency s ank JPL ' s  
propuls ion hopes . ARPA s ub s t ituted the 4 5 , 0 0 0-pound engine General 
E l e c t r i c  was D eveloping for Vanguard for JPL ' s  s econd s t age . The 
laboratory was left with j us t  its 6 , 000-p ound upper stage and whatever 
i t might be ab l e  to s alvage f r om s at e�l i t e  and lunar miss ions . 4 
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JPL ' s  military alliance was changing , for by the summer o f  
1 9 5 8  a consensus was forming nationally that a c ivilian agency should 
p lay a maj or role in space exp lor at ion . The military wou ld r e t a in a 
s a t ellite role and p erhap s s omething mor e , but the Air Force , no t the 
Army would run the military space pro gram . JPL o f f icial s  were d ivided 
on the advisab i l ity o f  h i t ching their d e s t iny t o  the c ivilian s t ar . 
�any pers ons at JPL found the military grooves , c las� if ied documen t s  
and c l o s ed doors comfortab l e . Some JPL t e chnical s t a f f
members had worked happily in early s p a c e  int ell igence a c t ivities , 
s uch as Proj e c t  DUB . S ome favored s e t t ing up a space p r o gram within 
the Atomic Energy Commis s ion , which b o as t ed a reputat ion for skilled 
s c ient i f ic work und er t ight d e ad l ines and also had a long-range 
interes t in applying nuclear propuls ion to rocke try . But by spr ing 
1 9 5 8  JPL f ound the idea o f  a c ivil ian agency increas ingly a t t r ac t ive . 
As one o f  Director William H .  Pickering ' s  aides , J .  D .  McGar r i ty, put 
it : JPL and Calt ech had " a lmo s t  . . . a moral obligat ion to s e e  that 
the a s s e t s  in a unique organ i z a tion l ike JPL . are not r e s tr ic t ed 
t o  serve only the military . "  Pres ident Dwight D .  E i s enhower pro p o s ed 
the c ivilian a g ency in Apr i l  1 9 5 8 . On July 2 9 , 1 9 5 8 , he s igned the 
b i l l , which an eager C ongr e s s  had broadened and s t r engthened , that 
created the Nat ional Aeronaut i c s  and Space Administrat ion . If JPL 
wanted to s e e  i t s  idea o f  a s p a c e  pro gram d evelop , the lab oratory 
needed to f ind an in s t itutional home in NASA . 5 
The danger , a s many JPLers s aw it , was that NASA had b een 
created from the old National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics . NACA , 
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a f ed eral r e s earch es t ab l i shmen t d a t ing t o  1 9 1 5 , had done much impor-
t a n t  early w o r k  in aeronau t ic s ; P ickering credited NACA with develop­
ing the mod ern airp lane . Bu t JPL s t a f f ers , who t ended to b e  d i sdainful 
of c ivil s erv ice s cienc e in genera l , though t  NACA by the 1 9 5 0 s  had 
b e c ome an uni�aginat ive bureaucracy mor e  conc erned with pushing known 
p r inc iples to the next decimal p o in t  than in making genuinely o r i g inal 
d i s c overies . Perhaps even wor s e  for s ome JPL s t a f f  member s ,  NACA 
s e emed to have b ecome l i t t le more than a s ervi c e  bureau for the Air 
Force and a ircr a f t . f irms . The new NASA wou ld b e  " f i l led rap id ly by 
j elly- fish typ e indi vidual s , " pred icted C l i f f  Cummings , a s enior JPL 
engineer . NACA ' s ideas o f  program and organizat ion s e emed , further-
more , t o  thr e a t en JPL . NACA planning f o cu s ed on s a t e l l i t e s . For ins tanc e , 
the Stever C ono� i t t ee , chaired by H. Guy ford S t ever of MIT , d id not
include lunar or planetary f l igh t s  in its report in the fall o f  1 9 5 8 . 
The organizat ional s tr a t e gy sugge s t ed that NACA would s lowly grow 
in to NASA. The new agency w o u l d  c ondu c t  res earch a t  i t s  own civ i l
s ervice center s and contract outside exten s ively , chi e f ly with 
a i r c r a f t f inns . 6 
The NACA conce p t  o f  a s p a c e  agency s eemed b o th to thr e a t en 
JPL and present  it w ith an oppor tunity . The danger was that the
l ab o r a tory ' s r o l e  could b e  �arginal or , indeed , that an undynamic 
NASA migh t  falter . The lur e was that JPL cou ld p erhap s f i l l  the 
va cuum and push thro ugh its amb it ious pro gram plans . JPL was "uniquely 
capab l e  o f · p laying the pr imar y  r o l e  in the Nation ' s  s p a c e  program , "  
P ickering s a id . No o ther lab o ratory could b o a s t  i t s  wid e exp er ience 
in the key f ield s of r o cke try or its percentage of t alented p r o f e s ­
s ionals , ,JPLer s  believed . Exp lorer , and l a t e r  P i oneer � s e emed 
confirma t ion enough . I f  NACA exh ib ited a governmental b ias , JPL 
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hands a t t r ibuted much of their success to s tanding outside c ivil
s ervic e . The Jet Propuls ion Laboratory viewed i t s e l f  as ind ispen s ab le 
to a dynamic space p r ogram . When James R .  Killian , Eis enhower ' s  
s cienc e advis or , p ond ered JPL ' s  r o l e  in NAS A ,  P i cker ing argued : 
I b el ieve that it is e s s ential for the new agen cy 
to accept the concept o f  JPL as the nat i onal 
l ab oratory . I i  this i s  not done , then NASA will 
f l ounder around for s o  long that there i s  a good 
po s s ib il i t y  the ent ir e  pro gram wil l b e  carried by 
the m i l i t ar y  with NASA provid ing only s ome r e s ear ch 
sup p o r t  and p erhap s help ing with s c ient i f i c  p aylo ad s . 
If JPL d o e s  b ecome the nat ional space lab oratory 
on the o ther hand , then not only does a c omp l e t e  
experienced laboratory knowledgeab l e  i n  all phases
of the problem b ecome the key a s s e t  of NASA , but 
there is assurance that a realistic p r o gram will in 
fact be e s t ab l ished and pursued . As you wel l  know , 
one o f  the problems in the p r e s ent space pro gr am is 
the mul t ip l ic i ty o f  c ommi t t ees and groups whi ch are
p l anning programs . I t  is e s s ential for s ome comp e­
tent group t o  be g iven. a clear cut responsibil ity 
and told t o  draw up a real i s t i c  long t erm program 
which they can succ e s s fully comp l e t e  on s chedule . 
Perhaps r enamed "Nat ional Space Lab orator ies , " as s ome JPL engineer s 
sugge s t ed , the Pas adena l aboratory would dominate NASA .7 
P icker ing and Caltech Pres ident Lee A .  DuB r idge responded 
eagerly t o  the f i r s t  NASA overtur e s  in the fall of 1 9 5 8 . When NASA 
began operat ion on O c t ob er 1 , 1 9 5 8 , there was a g rowing s ens e 
within the organization that a more amb i t ious pro gram than what NACA 
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had out l ined should be a t t empted . Th i s  view r e f l ected in part the 
ideas of memb er s  of the Naval Res earch Lab o r a t o r y , wh ich NASA ab sorbed
on Oc tober 1 .  Although JPL had t ended t o  d iminish the Navy laboratory ' s  
capab il i t ie·s b ecaus e o f  i t s  c ivil s ervic e connect ion and it s mis f ortunes 
with Vanguard , NRL pers onnel d is p layed c omp e t ence and ima g inat ion that 
would surpr i s e  and some t imes confound JPL . The first NASA admin i s t ra-
to r ,  T .  Keith Glennan , pres ident of the Case Ins titute of Technology in 
Clevel and and a former AEC commis s ioner , a l s o  f avored a more aggr e s s iv e  
program .  Glennan wan t e d  t o  sna t ch the Army ' s  ent ir e  space package --
ABHA and JPL -- s o  that NASA could " a cquire at the ear l i e s t  p o s s ib l e  
d a t e  a d evelopmen t a l  and opera t ional capab i l ity for l a r g e  space 
vehic l e s . "  The NASA chief did no t want t o  depend on the milit ary 
s ervice� for vehicle s . ABMA b o a s t ed exp erience in comp lete space 
vehic les . " JPL has strong capab i l i t ie s  r e l a t ing to small p ayload 
package s , guidance , e l e c t ronics and t o  upper- s tage b o o s t er s y s t ems , 
and high-energy �ocke t s , thereby comp lement ing ABMA ' s  l imited 
experien c e  in the s e  f ields , "  a NASA s t a f f  report noted . To d evelop 
f a c i l i t i e �  equivalent t o  JPL wou ld r equ ir e $ 6 0 mi ll ion , invo lve 
recru i t ing 2 , 0 0 0  t o  3 , 000 p eople , and t ake three or four year s . 8 
The Depar tment of D e f en s e  did not want to lose JPL . As s i s tant 
S e cre t ary o f  D e f ens e Donald Qua r l e s  ar gued that the laboratory , p ar t i-
cularly i t s  work on the S ergeant mis s i l e , was too imp o r t ant t o  
national secur i ty t o  allow t h e  changeover . But t h e  Army wanted 
d e sperately to keep ABMA to mainta in i t s  toeho ld in l ong-range 
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mis s ilery . A c ompromis e  was r eached quickly . NASA would get JPL ; the 
Army would keep ABMA for at leas t ano ther year . In three sho r t  negot ia­
t ing s e s s ions , NASA and DOD worked out the arrangements for tran s ferring 
JPL property and personne l .  The laboratory would s e e  the Sergeant pro­
gram t o  c omplet ion which was exp e c t ed in 1 9 6 0 , and it would c o n t inue to 
do s ome r e s earch for the Army . E i s enhower s igned an execut ive order 
approving the trans fer on Dec emb er 3 , 1 9 5 8 , and the bulk of JPL e f fort s 
came under NASA j ur is d i c t ion on January 1 ,  1 9 5 9 . The s pace agency 
contract paralleled the one JPL had enj oyed with Army Ordnanc e , thus 
allowing the laboratory t o  retain wide d is c r e t ion in its operat ions . 
The s e c ond NASA adminis trator , James E .  Webb , said he would never have 
wri t t en the contract that way , but any doub t s  that surfaced in 1 9 5 8  were 
s ubmerged by the s en s e  o f  urgency and d e s ire for a smo o th trans it ion . 9 
As JPL and NASA emb arked on their unchart ed cours e ,  neither 
organizat ion had as s imilat ed the o ther ' s  ideas ab out their r e s p e c t ive 
ro les . DuBridge t o ld the Caltech t rus tees tha t " JPL will b e  NASA ' s  
maj or space f l i ght laboratory . "  But NASA o f f ic ials , while no t yet 
d e f in i t e ,  s eemed to have mor e  mo d e s t  amb i t ions for their acqui s i t ion . A 
d r a f t  out l ine o f  JPL ' s  mis s ion in October 1 9 58 by NASA headquar ters 
pointed f i r s t  t o : " Support ing res earch in c ommunicat ions , t e l emetry·, 
guid anc e and contro l ,  rocket propuls ion u t il i z ing b o t h  s o lid and l i qu id 
propel lants and in related f ields -- all subj e c t  to c o o r d inat ion with 
o t her Centers to avo id und e s ir ab l e  dup licat ion . "  S econdar ily it
sket ched : " s p ec i f ic int erplanetary miss ion a s s i gnments t o gether with 
related res earch and d evelopment includ in g , in s ome c a s e s , t echnical 
direct ion . " The vas t  gap between thes e two conc e p t s  o f  r o l e s  would 
fuel controve r s i e s  for years . 10
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* * * *. * 
One o f  the f i r s t  produc t s  o f  JPL ' s  relat ionship with NASA was 
a long - range pro gram f o r  space exp lorat ion . As Pickering had to ld 
Kill ian , p l anning for spac e explorat ion had heretofore b een hapha z ard , 
even s ch i z ophren i c . P r o gram s k e t c he s  had veered from NACA ' s  penchant 
for caut ious inc remental advan c e s  t o  ABMA ' s  exc e s s ively exub erant plans 
for manned vehicles t o  range th:oughout the s o lar sys t em in the next 
q ecade . B o t h  ex t r emes had in c ommon the a s sump t ion that almo s t  any thing , 
whether smal l or large , could be j u s t i f ied in the space program .  NASA 
agreed to fund a $ 1 . 3  mi l l ion s tudy a t  JPL in O c t ob er 1958 , even b e f o r e  
n e go t iat ions t o  add t h e  lab o r a t o ry t o  the new agency h a d  b e en c omp l e t ed . 
JPL " o f f ic i a l s  f e l t  they wer e out l in ing not only the laborat ory ' s  . future 
pro gram but NASA ' s  maj or s p a c e  p r o gram .  From Novemb er 1 9 5 8  through 
January 1 9 5 9  s ev eral top s t a f f  memb er s  o f  the laboratory d evo t ed c on­
s id erab l e t ime to wha t would prove t o  b e  a reveal ing s tudy . 1 1  
T h e  f i r s t f l igh t , a c ir c umlunar p r ob e , would t a k e  plac e i n  Ju ly 
1 9 6 0 .  Tw o  Mars f l i gh t s  would f o l low in October , when the r ed p lanet mad e  
i t s  neares t approach to Earth . A brace o f f l ights t o  Venus would oc cur in 
January i961 . Dur ing the next eigh t e en months , when Venus and Mars were too
far away f o r  favorab l e  l aunch ing c ond i t ions , JPL would prac t ic e with an e s ­
c a p e  o u t  o f  e c l i p t ic orb i t  i n  Se p t emb er 1961 and a lunar s a t el l it e  in Ap r i l
1962 . Venus s a t e l l i t e s  would f o l low i n  summer 1 9 6 2  and Mar s near mi s s es la t e
i n  t h e  year . With the p lanet s  again out o f  p o s it ion in 1963 , three lunar 
f l i gh t s  were s chedul e d . The plann ers l i s t ed fl i ght s  a f t er 1 9 6 3  as t ent a t ive . 
They cons i s t ed o f  Venus land ings in the s p r ing o f  1 9 6 4 , a manned c ircumlunar 
10 
f light in Augu s t 1 9 64 , and a manned f l ight around Mars and r eturn in
January 1 9 6 5 . The JPL t imet ab l e  o f  eight een f l ight s  in f ive years wa s  
exce ed ingly op t imis t ic . The Mar s  probes s chedu led for 1 9 6 0  r epre s ent ed 
a big j ump over the P ioneers the l ab o r atory was engineer ing at the t ime 
of the p l anning s tudy , and s ome of the f l igh t s outlined have y e t  to b e  
a t t emp t ed . B u t  some JPL p ar t ic ip an t s  f e l t  t h e  ske t ch might b e  c r i t i c i z ed 
as t o o  cons ervat ive , and they pondered " s p i c ing it up with ' sp ectaculars . • 1 1 1 2  
S ince t h e  p l an w a s  t h e  f irs t sys t emat i c  l o o k  at space expl or a-
t ion by ' a NASA agency , it r evealed much ab out early thinking about s pace 
even though it was n o t  imp l emen t e d . Other s tudies had t ended to look f ir s t  
at techno l o gy and try to f ind · a  mis s ion to f i t ; JPL d e c ided ins tead that 
m i s s ions should come f ir s t  and then veh ic les , tr acking , f ac i l i t ies , and 
the l ike coul d  b e  made to f i t . The p l an r evealed , f i rs t , JPL ' s  commitment 
to plan,etary explorat ion . The lunar f l ight s , while o f  s ome intrin s i c  mer i t , 
p layed a r o l e  p r imarily as t e s t  runs for the p lane tary voyages . S econd , 
the lead ing c r i t e r ion  that guided the cho ice o f  mis s ions was t e chnical 
f easibility . The t imetab ' ' took advant age o f  every opp or tunity when Mar s 
and Venus a s s umed the b e s t  p o s i t ions for launches . Feasib i l i ty was linked , 
third ly , to drama t i c  impac t .  " The pub l i c  d emand s sudd en and s p e c t a cular 
a chievement s  from their [ s ic ]  space program , "  the f inal repo:rt concluded . 
JPL ranked " pub l ic react ion" s e cond only t o  f e a s ib i l ity in the s ca l e  o f
criteria f o r  mis s ion cho i c e s ; s cient i f i c  and t echnical mer it r anked third . 
Indeed , s c ient ific obj e c t ives were s ke t ched only in general t erms and they 
wer e made to fit ar ound the mis s ions ; the cho i c e  o f  mis s ions was not b as ed 
on a survey of the key s cientific ques t ions t o  which the s� ac e program might 
add r e s s  it s el f . P icker ing told Medar is that through mid - 1 9 6 2  " s c ient i f ic 
11 
exp e r imentat ion would be carried along when s p ac e  and t ime p ermi t t e d . "  
The laboratory , fourth , d id no t at this po int anticipate the gap .that 
eventually aro s e  b e tween proponen t s  of manned and unmanned space f light , 
with s c ient i f ic advoc a t e s  usually f avoring the unmanned s e gment . " Cer tainly , 
a manned l and ing on ano ther p l anet i s  one o f  the mos t  impor tant obj ec t ives 
o f  a l ong-range program , "  the report s aid . "Regar d l e s s  of how clever we 
b e c ome with remo t e  measuring d ev ic'es , one hard-r o ck geo logis t land ed on 
the moon , for example , would be wor th many tons of automatic equipment . "  l 3
I n  t h e  cour s e  o f  t h e  study t h e  JPL p l anners s ome t imes wor r i ed 
how s p a c e  exp l o r a t ion might b e  j us t if ied and c ons idered drawing on the C a l t ech 
hu�an i t i e s  d ivis ion for help . In the repor t , however , p o s s ib il i ty became 
i t s  own j u s t i f i c a t ion . The laboratory , l ike NASA throughout much of i t s  
early h i s t o ry , did not s o  m u c h  answer t h e  que s t ion o f  j us t i f icat ion as assume 
that a putat ive pub l ic d emand for f i r s t s  in the space race p rovided one . To 
JPL early unmanned d e e p  space probes o f f e r ed the b e s t  rou t e  for fas t , dramatic 
b u r s t s  in the space race . 
Onc e JPL had s el e c ted the niss ions , it b e gan to f i t  the hardware 
around them . The main t e chnical prob l em in NASA ' s  f ir s t  s everal years 
was build ing rel iab l e  f i r s t-s tage b o o s t e r s . James D .  Burke , who headed the
propul s ion s e gment of the s tudy , o u t l ined a p lan for a " unif ie d  veh i c l e
f am i ly . "  He hoped t o  s e e  NASA s e l e c t  a minimum o f  b a s i c  d e s igns and s t ick 
with them s o  that they would d evelop the maximum exp erience and r e l iab ility . 
IRBMs wer e cons idered but d i s carded in favo r o f  the larger ICBMs . The 
lab o r atory proposed three clas s e s  of vehicles . Providing an es cap e payload 
o f  1 5 0  to 3 0 0  pound s , Veh i c l e  A would cons i s t  o f  an I CBM and appropriate 
upper s tages ; Vehicle B would be similar but larger and provide 3 0 0  to 1000 
pound s p ayload . The third clas s , Jup iter V ,  eventually known as S aturn I ,  
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was tagged a s  the deep space workhor s e  vehic l e . Von Braun ' s  dream child , 
Jup it er V cons i s t ed o f  eight to e l even Jupiters s trapped t o gether to develop 
1 to 1 . 5  mill ion pound s o f  thrus t .  ABMA thought i t  would b e  ready in 1 9 6 2 .  
In JPL ' s ou t l ine the f ir s t  s tage boo s t er s  o f  the early years would become 
the s.econd s tage vehicles of the Jup iter V .  The laboratory t ried to pre­
s erve i t s  role in propul s ion by emphas i z ing the importance of the 6K r o cket 
it already had und er d evelopment f o r  the f inal s tage . NASA accepted the 
veh0i c l e  plan largely intact , for it s eemed t o  o f fer a rapid , reliabl e  way 
out o f  the f o r e s t  o f  conf l i c t ing rocket d es igns . JPL also outlined maj o r  
expans ions o f  tracking and, o ther facilit ies t h a t  i t s  pro gram requ ired . 
Thes e ' r emained t o  b e  hammered out with NASA as actual program and budgetary 
d e c i s ions ma t e r ial ized . 1 4  
NASA o f f ic ials reviewed t h e  program at t h e  P asadena laboratory o n  
January 1 2-13 , 1 9 5 9 . The f i r s t  full-dre s s  s e s s ion b e tween JPL and NASA 
o f f ic ials , the meet ing revealed s ome agreement and yet s ome s ign i f icant 
gap s in und e r s t and ing b e tween JPL and NASA . P ickering said the lab o ratory 
wanted to cont inue a balanced overall pro gram o f  sup p o r t ing res earch , 
advanced d evelopment , and development . "A s trong ' in hous e '  capab i l ity 
is nec es sary t o  ma intain technical comp e t enc e , "  he said . " The Laboratory 
expec t s  to g ive support to NASA , "  the JPL minu t e s  cont inued , "but it i s  
hoped that t echnic a l  supervis ion o f  p r o grams o ther than tho s e  in which 
the Laboratory has a direct inter e s t  will be kep t t o  a mini.mum . "  P icke r ing 
s tres s ed the nec e s s ity of a long-range view and hop ed that all of JPL ' s  
work in 1 9 5 9  would b e  d ir ec t ed toward deep space . 15 
Dr . Ab e S ilvers t e in ,  d irector o f  NASA ' s  Office o f  Space Flight 
Development , agreed with the need for a long-range program . But he also 
s tres s ed the need for produc ing immed iately . Notes on S i lvers t ein ' s  
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remarks t aken by Homer Newe l l , h e a d  o f  NASA ' s  s pace s c ienc e o f f ic e , 
exp la ined : "Long er range d evelopm . of c o ur s e . But mus t build up con-
f idence o f  C ongr es s s o  that they will provide the support . "  S i lver s t ein 
wan t ed JPL to f e e l  i t was a part o f  NASA and was a c t in g  from the ins id e , 
not j us t  as ano ther contrac tor . "NASA has a rugged j ob monit o r i ng nat ' l  
p r o gram , "  Newe l l  re c ord ed . S i lver s t e in p u t  p ar t icular emphas i s  on the 
need for a na t ional program ,  and his ho p e  that JPL could he lp out broadly . 
The d i f f erenc es b e tween P i c kering and S ilver s t ein r epr e s ented mor e  than 
nuanc e s . The f r i c t ion b etwe en sho r t - t erm and long-t erm , and b e tween 
national and p a r o c h i a l  p r o g r ams aro s e  f r om t h e  b a s ic clash over the relative 
16 
ind ep end enc e , o f JPl, w i thin NAS A .  
JPL pr e s s ed NASA h a r d  early i n  1 9 5 9  f o r  au tho r i z a t ion t o take the 
f ir s t  s t ep in i t s  s p a c e  pro gram , P r o j ec t V e ga . Three early round s were 
pro grammed in a c c ordanc e with the ·JPL f ive-y ear p lan -- lunar a:J.d Mars p rob es 
in the s ec ond half o f  19 6 0  and a Ven us f l ight in 1 9 6 1 . (The fourth would b e  
a n e w  me t eo r o l o g i c a l  . ear th s a t e l l it e ; two t o  four mor e  f l igh t s  would b e  
d e t ermined later . )  The veh i c le f o r  t h e s e  f l i ght s cons i s t ed o f  a p ayload and 
a t h r e e- s tage r o c ke t . The f i r s t  s t a g e  At l as would be d evel o p ed by Convair 
As t ronaut ics , the s econd would emp loy the Vanguard rocket des igned by 
General E l e c t r i c , and the third would u s e  the 6K s egment JPL had b e en 
working on . Vega was only an int erim veh ic l e , who s e  us efulnes s  would ex-
t end only un t il the C ent aur was r eady in 1 9 6 2 ; but P icker ing t o l d  G lennan 
in 1 9 5 9  it r anked nonetheles s as " one of the mo s t  important a c t ions which 
NASA mus t take this year . "  Vega promised a quick p l anet ary c apab ility , and 
s ome of the p ro gr am ' s s e gments  would b�c ome build in g  b locks for later d evelop-
ment s .  As the f ir s t  veh ic l e  sys t em NASA would build under i t s  own direc t ion 
and for s c ient i f ic and c ivi l ian purpo s e s , Vega would free the agency from its
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dependenc e on mili tary vehic les . I f  NASA d id no t inaugura t e  Vega at once , 
P icker ing po inted out on March 2 4 , 1 9 5 9 , two s er ious cons equences would 
follow . ' Firs t ,  the Mar s  1 9 60 f l ight would have .to be s cr apped , "with 
consequent lo s s  of p r e s t ige t o  b o th the U . S .  and NASA . "  Second , any 
s l ippage in d evelopment would endanger Vega ' s  lead t ime over C entaur and 
g ive force to the argument that NASA should j u s t  wait for C en t aur . The 
' . 
d es ire . b o th to s t art a p lane tary f l i gh t  program quic�ly and to f r e e  NASA 
from its mil it ary dependency induced JPL to c a s t  i t s  lot with Vega . 17 
After long delays in its chao t ic early mon ths ,  NASA f inally 
author i z ed the Vega program a t  JPL on Mar ch 2 6 , 1 9 5 9 . From the s t a r t  a 
ho s t  o f  pr ob l ems -- budg etary , o rgani zat ional , and t e chnical -- p lagued 
Vega . The proj e c t  never received the f inancial s up p o r t  i t  need ed but
had to op er at e und er s er ious bud g e t ary and manp ower r es tr ic t ions , es p ec i-
a l ly in the areas o u t s i d e  propu ls ion . By 1 9 5 9  NASA had ass igned pr iority 
t o  Proj e c t  Mercury , the Unit ed S t a t e s ' f ir s t  man-in-sp ace venture , which 
l e f t  Vega cons t an t ly under funded . JPL faced cont inual o rgani zat ional 
wo es . The l aboratory had the r o l e  o f  proj e c t  manager to sup erv is e and 
integrate the whole e f f o r t , but it d id no t have the authority to mat ch . 
Unlike the Ser geant m i s s ile proj e c t , where JPL had enj oyed technical con-
trol and cons iderab l e  contract autho r i ty , the Vega operat ion l e f t  open 
virtually two l ines o f  author ity to the contrac tors -- one from the 
laboratory , the o ther from NASA headquar t er s . JPL felt the contrac t o r s  
s ided with the agency holding the pur s e , NASA headquar t ers . The agency ' s 
Washington o f f ice seemed continually confu s ing to the laboratory . Ins tead 
of one c entral proj ect o f f ice , as had been s e t  up for Mercury , Vega 
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e f f o r t s  r e q u i r e d  t �me- c onsuming and s ome t imes contradic tory coordination
with each of the maj or b ranches in NASA . Finally , the s chedule for launch­
ings s l ipped b ad ly . Th e r e  s imply were not enough launch s t ands available 
in the coun try to wedge in Vega f ir ing s , and NASA was slow in contracting 
to b u i ld add i t ional s tand s . By Novemb er 1 9 5 9  the firs t launching , origin­
ally s lated for summer 1 9 60 , had s l ipped to March 1 9 6 1 . Vega ' s  margin over 
C ent aur had d imini shed to a c r i t i c a l  po int .
18 
The technical d i f f i cu l t i e s  and high c o s t s  o f  space t echno logy , 
mo reover , ad d e d  to doub t s  ab ou t the p o s s ib ility o f  meet ing Vega ' s amb i t iou .1 
s chedu le . Co ns id er gu id anc e , one o f  JPL ' s  prime respons ibilities . No 
Amer i c an s pa c e  prob e launched through the summer o f 1 9 5 9  could b o a s t  o f
gu idance in t o or a f t e r  t h e  inj e c tion phas e . The mos t  advanced s pin-·s tab ilized
veh i c l e  w a s  e s t imat ed t o  h a v e  no b e t ter than an even chanc e o f  impact ing the
moo n ,  and s ome e s t imat es ran ged as low a s  t en per c ent . True space-mis s ion
c a p ab il i t i e s  requ ir ed guidanc e not only through inj e c t ion , however , but also
the c a p ab ility b o th t o  p e r f o nn mid cours e correct ions and to complete  t enninal 
maneuver s ,  wh e ther f o r  o r b i t  or s o f t land ing . JPL eng ineers b e gan to think 
tha t the s en s ib le cour s e  wo u ld be to u s e  lunar flights as the proving ground
for d evelo p ing all the e l emen t s  of a s p a c e c r a f t  sys t em .  The shor ter d is tance . 
to the m o o n  made p o ssib l e  m o r e  ec onomical d evelopment , and the mor e  frequent
launch o p p o r tuni t i e s  promis ed f a s t er p r o g r e s s .  Wi thout que s t ion the lunar 
empha s i s  weakened the p l an e t ary pro gram that JPL d e s ired . But as a lab orat ory 
repo r t  p o in t e d  o u t  in O c t o b e r  1 9 5 9 : "I t i s  impo s s ib l e , in a s ix-vehic le 
program hav ing the curren t manp ower and fund ing l im i t a t ion , to m ix equally 
lunar and int erplane t ary pro g r ams without s eriously j eopard i z ing the whole
pro gram . " I t  was al s o impo s s ib l e , th e rep o r t  concluded , "to  ad equately 
d i s gu i s e  an interp lanetary P.r o gram as a lunar program . "  The l ab ora to ry 
thus ar gued for "a s t rong lunar . program in which the in t erplanet ary capab i l i ty 
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i s  les s than optimum . "  1 9 
JPL was in part making a virtue of necess i ty , for by the fall 
o f  1 9 5 9  Vega little  resemb led the s cenario of a f ew months earl ier . Aiming 
at the most d i f ficult prob lems f irs t ,  JPL engineers had p i t ched their
initial designs at the Mars 1960 prob e . They soon decided that a Mars 
mis s ion pos ed too many t echni cal barriers for so new a pro gram . The Mars
mission, whi ch Hibbs had once termed "of the utmo s t impor t anc e , "  faded out
in June 1 9 5 9 . A more r eal is t i c Mar s  a t t emp t was sketched f o r  Oc t.o b e r  1 9 62 . 
Glennan g o t  cold feet ab o u t  th� Venus miss ion also in the summer o f  1 9 5 9 . He 
po int ed out t o  Eis enhower that the propo sed launch , in January . 1 9 6 1 , would be 
only the f i r s t  o r  � econd firing o f  the Vega vehicl e ,  " and the  chanc es o f  full 
success s e em ( ed ]  qui te low . " The NASA adminis trator deferr ed the Venus 
venture unt il 1 9 6 2 , when it would again as sume an app r oachab1e p o s i t ion . By 
the fall of 1 9 5 9  the f irst four Vegas had b een cut back to lunar mis s ions , 
the f irs t of which would t ake place in March 1 9 6 1 . The p lanetary probes would 
have to wai t  unt i l  1 9 6 2 . If the s chedule s lipped mu ch more , Vega would
become an example o f  the very prob l em i t  was sup p o s e d  to correc t : a short-
term vehicle that would b e  u s ed for t o o  few mis s ions t o  assure much relia-
. 20 bil ity and then would b e  d i s carded . 
Despite thes e problems Vega might have s urvived had n o t  a 
competitor surpr is ingly emer ged from the murky waters of the military-spac� 
bureaucracy . The r ival wa s Agena-B , a cland e s t ine Air Force proj e c t  
wh ich had capab i l it ie s s imilar to the second and third s tages o f  Vega , NASA 
and military of f ic ials had t rad ed information on the ir veh i c l e  p lans in 
Decemb er 1958 , and had formal i zed them in "A Nat ional Space Veh i c l e  Pro gram" 
on January 2 7 , 1 9 5 9 . Agena had not been ment ioned , even though the Air Force 
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apparent ly b egan i t s d evelo pment about that t ime . T h e  Air Force u s e d  the
Agena as the inj e c t ion s t age in its D i s c overer s a t e l l i t e  program -- a role 
Vega could eas ily have as sumed . NASA did no t learn o f  the in t erloper unt il
l a t e  summer 1 9 5 9 .  The dup l i c a t ion could not b e  j us t i fi ed ; Pres ident 
E is enhower .reac ted angr ily when h e  heard of the Air For c e ' s  maneuver . Bu t 
NASA b owed to f o r c e  maj eur ; Gl ennan r e c o gn i z ed the po lit ica l clout the 
Air Fo rc e wi eld ed in Con g r e s s . Even though Vega had p r ior r ights t o
d evelo pment ,  and i t s ab andoruiient l o s t  $ 1 7  million , h e  d e c ided t o  c ancel 
i t  and adop t Agena-B in early D e c emb er 1 9 5 9 . 2 1  
" Qu i t e  a bomb shell you threw a t  u s , "  P icker in g t o ld NASA Ass is­
t a n t  Adminis t r a t o r  Richard H o r n e r  o n  D ec emb er 8 .  The JPL head had l earned
of the c anc e l l a t ion only the d ay b e f o r e ; labo ra to ry documents as r e c en t  a s  
D e c emb er 3 had s t i l l a s s igned Vega prominent roles . Gl ennan had inf ormed
Pickering of the d ec i s ion but had n o t  s o ught JPL ' s  c ons ent . The canc el­
lat ion caus e d  c ons t erna t ion a t  t h e  lab o ra t ory . JPL had p inned mo s t  o f  it s 
early s p a c e  dr eams to Vega ; P icker ing had exp e c t ed that half o f  the labora­
tory ' s  e f f o r t  in 1 9 6 0  -- almo s t  every thing exc ept fo r the S er geant mis s il e -­
would b e  d evo t ed to Vega . The 6K p r o p u l s ion d ev el opmen t proj e c t  was r educed
t o  r e s earch s t a t u s . This marked a h i s t or i c  turn in the lab o r at ory . Never
a gain wou ld pro puls ion , the f ield in wh ich the lab ora t ory had f ir s t
gained fame , a s s ume promL.enc e at JPL . 2 2  
" I  look at  thi s and g e t  conc erned over the who l e  p lan o f  the
Lab ' s  par t in NASA , "  P ic ker ing told Horner . ' ' The imp l ic a t ion is p retty
heavy as ' to reorientat ion o f  JfL . "  Horner a greed that the d e c i s ion "mus t be 
d i s turbing in many r es pe c t s  to you and your s ta f f . "  I t  would enta i l  " a
maj o r  reorientat ion" o f  the labor atory ' s work , h e  ackn owled ged . B u t  the
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canc ellat ion , he c ont inu ed , contr ibut ed t o  s or t ing out the r o l e s  of the 
NASA c ent ers that Glennan had d e s ir ed for some t ime . The s pace agency 
had f inally wrenched ABMA f rom the Army . Von B raun ' s  group would a s sume 
res pons ib i l i ty f o r  launch vehicle sys t ems . Th e new Goddard Spac e Flight 
Center in B eltsvil l e , Maryl and , wo uld supervise earth s a t e l l i t e  s p a c e­
craft and s o unding rocket p ayloads . The Jet Propul s ion Laboratory 
would t ake over the d evelopment a n d  operat ion o f  s p ac ec ra f t for lunar 
and plane t ary explorat ion . Al thou gh it meant abandonment of veh i c l e
sys t ems work , this w a s  a n  amp l e  as s i gnmen t . P icker in g acknowl ed ged 
later the l ab o r a t o ry probably c o u l d  no t have ma in t a ined i t s  propuls ion 
and .vehic l e  work along with the . s p a c e c r a f t  a s s i gnmen t . · rn the sho r t
run , however ,  J P L  o f f ic ial s had to de t ermin e where their s p a c e  r o le 
2 3  would lead over t h e  n ext f ew y ears . 
By the end o f  Dec emb er JPL and NASA o f f i c ials ham er ed out 
a r evis ed s p a c e  pro gram for the labora t o ry . The s o lu t ion blended
headquar t er s ' p re f er enc e f o r  lunar fl ight s with JPL ' s  d e s i gns for
p lanet ary exp lorat ion . S even f l i gh t s  were p lann ed . F iv e  lunar
rec onna i s s an c e  mi s s ions were s cheduled from s p r in g  1 9 6 1  t hrou gh fall
1 9 6 2 ; known as Rangers , thes e would u s e  the At l a s -Ag ena B .  Venus 
and Mar s  pr ob es would f o llow in the s ec ond hal f of 1 9 6 2 ; c arrying th e
name Mar iner s , they would b e  pr op el l ed b y  the Atlas and t � e  n ew C ent aur . 
B o th NASA and JPL agreed that it was " t echn i c a l ly p o s s ib l e and hi ghly 
d es irab l e  to fly early . " This p o s ed a h igh-r isk dec is ion . S in c e  the
Vega sp ac ecraft had b een t ar g e ted f o r  pl anet ary mis s ions ,  i t  was mor e
c ompl ex and p o t entially rais ed mo r e prob l ems than n ec e s s ary i n  a lunar
reconnai s s an c e  obj ect . On the o ther hand , by making u s e  o f  the d es ign
to that po int , ;;t con t inuat ion of the Vega p l ans had the appeal of
p ot ent ial ly faster and mor e e c onomical development . The Vega space­
c r a f t  thus b e c ame th e basis for b o th Ranger and the early Mar�ners . 2
4 
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I n  the a f t ermath o f  the c anc e l l a t ion o f  Vega , JPL ' s  p r o gram for 
the las t s everal years had b een bas ically det ermined . The lunar 
pro gram exp and ed rap idly in 1 9 6 0 . Tha t summer the labo r a t o ry l e t  
c o n t r a c t s  t o  f o u r  indus t r ial firms t o ·  s tudy t h e  n e x t  pha s e  o f  i t s  
.lunar program , t h e  s o f t- land er eventually known a s  Surveyor .  A s  the
Sergeant mis s il e  work was phased out , the Mariner proj ec t s , a formidab l e  
c ompe t i t o r  t o  t h e  lunar s id e , b egan moving u p  from t h e  ins ide . By the 
end of 1 9 6 0  Ranger s p a c e c r a f t  was nearing the ass emb ly s t a ge , and 
* 
Mar iner des ign conc ep t s  were appro aching the f i r s t  a t t empt s  a t  hardware .  
* * * * * 
Dur in g  the pro gram reor ient a t ion o f  late 1 9 5 9  and ear ly 
1 9 6 0 , the l aboratory o rgani z a t ion , wh ich had b e en fairly info rmal , 
b e gan to b ec ome more bureauc r a t i z ed . P icke r ing appo int ed Br ian Sp arks 
as the f i r s t  deputy d i r e c t o r  in 1 9 5 9  and gave him cons iderab l e  author ity 
over d ay-to-day a f f a ir s . Two o ther s t a f f  engine er s , J .  W. McGarr ity 
and J. I. Shafer , p r ovid ed l imited s t a f f  a s s i s t ance t o  the d irec t o r . 
Planning supp o r t  c ame from a f our-man planning s t a f f  h eaded by As s is tant 
D i r e c t o r  J .  D .  McKenney . Ass i s t ant D ir e c t o r  Frank E .  God dard , who had 
b e en d e t ailed t o  NASA headquar t er s  for a t ime a f t er the agency was 
f o rmed , hand l ed JPL-NASA r e la t ions . Bus ine s s  admin i s t ra t ion cont inued 
to be headed by Val C .  Lars en , Jr . ,  the third a s s i s t ant director . Two 
* D e s c r ipt ions of the spacec raf t s will be found in foll�w ing chap t ers . 
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program d irectors round ed out t h e  directo r ' s  o f f ic e : C l i f f  I.  Cummings , 
who head ed the Ranger effor� and Rob e r t  J .  Parks , who ran the S ergeant · 
miss ile program unt il the JPL p or t ion was pha s ed out on June 3 0 , 1 9 6 0 , 
when he b ec ame full- t ime head o f  the Mar iner program . P icker ing also 
mad e inc r e a s ing and mo r e  formal use o f  the s enior s t a f f , a ·  group o f
twent y  t o  thirty exec u t ives including the d ir ec t or ' s o f f i c e  s t a f f , 
the d ivis ion chief s , and s ome adminis t r a t ive and s elec t ed o ther 
per s onnel . The weekly s enior s t a f f  meet ings were a s ignificant . f o rum 
for d �scus s ing lab orat ory po l ic ie s . 25
The t echnic al work o f  the lab oratory w a s  o r ganiz ed in 
acc ordanc e with the "matrix "  conc ept . The mat r ix would r emain the
lab o ratory ' s  bas ic organ i z a t ion patt ern for the n ex t  two d ecades , 
although it wa s s ub j ect to c r i t ic ism and s evere s t rains . Eased on a 
s tudy by the management · analy s i s  firm o f  McKins ey & C o . ,  the JPL 
mat r ix r e s emb l ed f o rms in u s e  at Argonne Laboratory , Marshall Space 
Flight C enter , Hughes Aircraft C o rp . , and o ther indus t r ial f irms . 
The l ine organ i z a t ion of th e t echnical s t a f f  was d ivided among s even * 
t echnical d ivis ions , s omewhat analo gous to un ive r s i ty d epar tment s ; 
then a small proj e c t  o rgani zat ion would f o rm a thin overlay across the 
d ivis ions . Th e  rat ionale b eh ind the mat r ix concept was that the 
t echnical d ivis ions carried the ongo ing work of the lab oratory while 
proj e c t  o f f ic e s  wer e  f in i t e  and sub j ec t  t o  d is s olut ion . S inc e s everal 
s imilar pro j e c t s  would b e  g o ing on s imul taneously , the b es t t echnical 
talent would p r esumab ly be app l i ed t o  any o r  all of the proj ec t s  a s  
needed ; s c ient is t s  and engineers would not b e  pigeonholed on one 
proj ect when their talent s might be needed e l s ewh er e .  The d ivis ion 
ch iefs wield ed great autho r ity . They exer ted cons id erab l e  influenc e 
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on t h e  p r o grams t,he laboratory undert ook through t h e i r  relat ionships 
with the d ir e c t o r ' s  s t a f f  aud pro gram o f f i c e s . Within their s atrapies 
the d ivis ion ch ie f s planned and d irec t ed all the laboratory ' s  ac t ivi-
t ie s ; approved all p ers onne l a c t ions , except for hiring and, f ir ing 
s e c t ion c h ie f s , wh ich r e quired the approval o f  the d epu ty d irec t or ;  
s h i f t ed fund s within p r o grams ; and controlled the fac ilit ies and 
equ ipment the d ivis ions used on a lon g-term bas is . 2 6
* The d iv i s ions a n d  t h e  s e c t ions und er them wer e : 
1 .  S y s t ems : Pr o gram Sup p or t , Sys t ems Analys is , Sys t ems Des ign , 
Sys t ems Tes t and Operat ion . 
2 .  Space Sc ienc es : Res earch Analys i s , Space Ins t rumen t s . 
3 .  Telec on nun icat ions : Communi c a t ions Sys t ems R e s e ar c h , 
C om un i c a t ions E n g i n e e r ing and Op e r at ions , 
Commun icat ions Elements Re s e arch , T e l eme t e r ing 
and Command Sys t ems . 
4 .  Gu idance and Con t ro l : E l e c tronic Devices , S e r geant Guidanc e
Engine e r in g , Gu idanc e and Control Engineer ing , 
E l e c t r o -Mechan i c a l  Devic e s . 
5 .  Eng in ee r ing Mechanic s :  Ma t er i a l s  Re s e arch , Mi s s il e 
Engine ering , P r o f e s s i o n a l  S ervic e s , Engineering 
Re s earch , Spacecra f t  Engineering , Des i gn . 
6 .  Phy s i c al S c iences : Chemical Phys i c s , Gas Dynamic s ,  Phy s ic s . 
7 .  Propul s i o n : S o l id P r o p e l lant Rocket s ,  S o l id Prop ellant 
Chemis t ry , L i quid Propul s ion Re search , Liquid
Propuls ion D eve lopmen t . 
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The pro gram d ir e c t o r  h a d  respons ib ility f o r  t h e  end produ c t  
o f  a g iven program ,  such as t h e  lunar pro gram , a f t er th e general des ign
approach had b e en s et t led by the s enior s t a f f . To a c c 0mp l i s h  this h e
had t o rely on t h e  t echnical d ivis ions , and much o f  h i s  't ime invo lved 
coordinat ion with the d iv i s io n  chiefs to insure they pr ovid ed the work 
required . · The pro gram d irec t o r  t r ied to iron out j ur i s d i c t ional d i s -
putes b e tween d ivis ions , al though they c o u l d  app eal t o  t h e  d eputy 
d irec t o r . The pro gram director a l s o  e s t abl ished liaison with 
contrac t o r s . His autho rity extended t o  programs , not pers onnel . His 
pers onnel authority r eached ' only h i s  immed iat e s t a f f ,  wh ich he was 
exp ec te(l to limit " r igorous ly . "  For ins t anc e ,  Cummings had only his
deputy , J .  D .  Burke , and two o t h e r  engineers on h i s  s t a f f  i n  mid - 1 9 6 0 ; 
but he d r ew on 6 0 0  p r o f e s s iona l s  d ivided among the d iv i s ions . The 
int erface b e tween the p r o gram d ir e c t o r s  and the d ivi s ion c h i e f s  p o s ed 
p o t en t ially the mos t  s e r ious prob l em in organi zat ion . The mat r ix 
' concep t had cons iderable va lid ity , espec ially as a means o f  insurin g
c ont inu ity o f  r e s earch a n d  advan c e d  development e f f o r t s , c ro s s -
f er t il iz a t ion o f  ideas , and rechar ging the s t a f f  through t h e  rap id 
int egrat ion of new t alent . As the laboratory became more heavily 
c ommit t ed t o  pro grams with s p ec i f ic obj ec t iv e s  and t i ght s chedul es , 
h owever , s e r ious doub t s  eme r g ed as to wh ether the pro gram o r gan i z at ion 
2 7  was s trong enough . 
While JPL ' s  int ernal reo r ganiz a t ion t o o k  plac e , the lab ora-
t ory al s o  fac ed a d i f f icult shakedown cru is e in it s ext ernal rela t ions 
with NASA . McKins ey & Co . had warned that the " o p er a t ion o f  a large
laborat ory , und er contract with a pr ivat e inst itution , pres ents problems 
unpreced ented " by NACA ' s exp erience with i t s  r e s ear ch c enters . Gl ennan 
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at o n e  p o int conf ided t o  his as s is tan t s  that " constan t  misunder s t and ings , 
accusat ions and ar gumeµ t s "  had marked the f i r s t  phase o f  NASA-JPL 
relat ions . JPL o f fic ials f e l t  equal ly fru s trat ed , with complaints that 
ranged from too much NASA int erf erence in t echnical minutiae to the 
direc t ion of the space program as a who l e . The conf l ic t s  focused on 
four areas . 28 
Firs t , the mo s t  b a s ic problem was what role JPL would p lay 
in NASA . ·  Did the laborat ory really f i t  ins id e , as S i lvers t e in had 
as sured P ickerin g ?  And how could JPL ' s  skills b e s t  b e  put to use in 
b alance with headquar t er s  and the o ther c enters ? "You have at JPL •an 
eager ' ab l e  and enthu s ias t i c  group , "  Gl ennan told Cal t ech Pres ident
DuBridge in Augu s t  1 9 5 9 . " G iven unl imit ed funds , they would b e  happy 
to s o lve all of our p r ob l ems . "  He cautioned DuBr idge , however , " tha t
everything i n  this f i e ld w i l l  no t b e  d o n e  by Goddard , by JPL or any 
other s ingle group . "  But having g iven the laborat ory the impres s ion 
it would oper�te f rom the ins id e , NASA had failed to f o l l ow through , 
the admin i s trator admi t t ed to his d eput ies . The Washington o f f ic e  had 
enc ouraged JPL to draw up long-range s tud ies , such as the f ive-year 
plan , but then it had not a t t empt ed to formulat e pro grams in res pO' • > e 
to them . P icker ing had <let.a iled s ome o f  his t o p  s ta f f  memb e r s  to 
headquar t ers , but , s a id Gl ennan , "we have failed to make a consc ious 
e f fo r t t o  make JPL a real part of NASA management . "  Glennan wond ered 
whe ther th e  ins ide approach had b e en wise or whether JPL s hould b e  
treated l i ke a s p ec ial contrac tor , such a s  the Lo s Alamos laboratory . 
o f  the AEc . 2 9 
JPL cha f ed under the pro grammatic , budgetary , and manpower 
res t r ic t ions NASA imp o s ed on it . The measure o f  aut onomy JPL had 
enj oyed under the Army s eemed neither po s s ib l e  nor d es irab l e  to the
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s pac e agency . P erhaps the mo s t  irr i t a t ing act ion was NASA ' s  impo s i t ion 
of a ceiling l imit ing JPL to 2 4 0 0  employees in 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 0 . The 
laboratory und erstood bud getary l imit s ,  but the pers onnel c urb s e emed 
arb i tr ary to JPL o f f ic ials . Laborat ory employment had c l imb ed to 
about 2650 in 1 9 5 9 , and when the Sergeant pro gram was phas ed out in 
mid- 1 9 6 0 , ab out 10 0  p er s ons had t o b e  terminated in add i t ion to no rmal 
a t t r i t ion .  Head quar t ers d e f ended the ceiling as a nec e s sary out growth 
of its b ud getary l imits , and its d e s ir e  t o  l imit in-hou s e  ac t ivities 
and encourage contrac t ing with ind u s t ry . Pasad ena and Washington · 
remained at odds on the is sue . 3 0  
JPL found s ome ameliorat ion o f  l ines o f  author ity , however � 
during the las t months b e f o r e  Glennan r e s i g_ned in January 1 9 6 1 . 
Although the laboratory ' s  t echnical ac t ivities on Ranger had mad e 
great s tr ides during 1 9 6 0 , the proj ect had b e en b o g ged down in o r gani-
zat ional chao s . NASA head quarters had b een r e luc t an t  either to dec en-
traliz e authority or to s e t  up a s p ec ial proj ect or ganizat ion . Und er 
the ad hoc arrangement that ensued , JPL , Mar shall Space Fl ight C enter , 
Lockheed , and the Air Force each had s p l inters o f authority . Con f l i c t s  
wer e bucked to - a  b icker ing , s l ow-moving c oordination � board for r e s o lut ion . 
A f ter mo s t  of 1 9 6 0  was consumed i_n iln or ganizat ional . ordeal , Ranger 
was reo r g�riiz.ed in January 1 9 6i . witb: Glennan ' s pr0omulgat ion of a maj or
. ' ·  . . . ' - . · �  . 
or g�n:i..:iiat iona+. change :in Manageme'nt . Ins truc t ion-_ 4�1-1 . The core o f
. . - � ,, . ' 
4�1..,1 was a Proj ec t · rfovelopiiient PLm� ' which set :  u? ; ipecific proj ect
o rganizat ions for NASA umiert�k�ngs and spelled :;i.Ji the r ight s  and . . 
. .., 
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duties of the NASA c en t er s . The PDP p r o c edure amp l i f ied an imp o r t an t  
agreement Caltech and JPL h a d  reached with NASA i n  Augus t 1 9�0 .  Head-
quart e r s  had exp l i c i t ly agreed t o  g ive the laboratory a vo ice in the 
d e t erminat ion of its pro gram and t o  al low JPL virtually free r e in 
in t e chnical ma t t e r s  unl e s s  maj or repro gramming was needed . The Augu s t  
und er s t anding assumed maj or imp o r t ance for JPL as a n  int erpretat ion 
of its b a s i c  contract with NASA . It emb o d ied the conc ept o f  "mutual i ty , "  
i . e .  that a c t ions were t o  b e  und ert aken a f t er b o th JPL and NASA agr eed ; 
NASA would no t i s s ue un ilateral d irec t ives . This agreement gave the
laborat ory much of the freedom i t  want ed ; now i t  had to p e r f o rm . 3 1
Desp i t e  these improvements in relation s , NASA c a s t  an 
increas ingly skep t ical eye at JPL in a s econd area : i t s  int ernal 
operation s . The main problem , a NASA s t a f f  memo said , was " lack o f  
full- t ime d irect ion o f  a decisive nature . "  Ano ther weakne s s , related 
to  the firs t ,  was " lack o f  admin i s t r a t iv e  dis c ip l ine , "  part icularly in 
the t e chnical s t a f f .  NASA b e l ieved that the d e c i s ions mad e b y  t o p  
manag ement w e r e  f requen t ly u p s e t  by the d ir e c t o r s  o f  t h e  t echnical 
d ivis ions . JPL al s o  lacked " ef f e c t ive f inanc.ial management and pro cure-
ment pro c e s s es . "  G e o r ge G r e en , the Calt ech b u s ine s s  manager , had 
agreed this problem ex is t ed and was working on c orrec t ive measure s .  
I t ems o f  l es s er imp o rtance in cluded the lack o f  s t a f f  as s i s tance t o  
t h e  d ir e c t o r , imprec i s e  l ines o f  authority , and s p l i t s  among the 
t echnical and non t echn�cal s id e s  of the hous e . To a greater or l e s s er 
d egree all these  obj ec tions -- warranted or no t would build over the
next s everal years and eventually f o r c e  JPL c l o s er t o  headquarters ' 
. ' ' l  h 3 2  o p eratin g  p n i  o s o p  y .  
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Third ,  NASA b e gan t o  show an a t t en t ivenes s  to the c onnec t ion , 
or lack o f  it , b e tween the laboratory and C a l t ech that had never 
int er e s t ed the Army . Gl ennan later termed the overhead f e e  the 
Ins t itut e had rec e ived for managing the laboratory in the Army days 
" a  b r ib e . "  He felt s igni ficant advantages c ould accrue from having 
a l ab oratory aligned with Calt ech , but he a l s o  wanted to s e e  s ome 
tangib l e  b en e f it s .  Adop t ing the voice o f  one college pres ident confidin g  
i n  ano ther , Glennan prais ed DuB r idge ' s  exp r e s s ed "det erminat ion t o  
b r ing t h e  ' r e s ources ' o f  t h e  Calt ech campus into a mor e  p o s i t ive and 
produ c t ive relat ionship with JPL . This s e ems to me to b e  the. very 
e s s enc e  o f  the reasoning b eh ind the involvement o f  an educa t ional 
ins t itution of high quality in the management and o p eration of an 
act ivity such as JPL . "  One p erhap s unexp ec t ed byproduct o f JPL ' s  
j o ining the c ivilian space ef fort was the opportunity , and the 
exp e c t at ion , o f  great er c ampus involvement . 3 3 
Fourth , JPL and NASA continued to d i f fer over the p a c e  o f  
the s p a c e  pro gr am .  The agency ' s  budget had c l imbed t o  $ 9 1 5  mill ion 
in f i s cal· year 1 9 6 1 , and by January 1 9 6 1  it had out l ined a t en-year 
p l an that f o r e c a s t  much of the Amer ican s p a c e  pro gram , inc lud ing 
s end ing a man t o  the moon , though only in the 1 9 7 0s . NA SA had cont inual ly 
rubbed again s t  the admin i s t r a t ion . E i s enhower was s t il l  cha s in g  the 
illu s o ry balanced b ud ge t , but h e  al s o  app eared s incer ely to b e l ieve 
that the Uni t ed S t a t e s  was not racing the Rus s ians but engaging in 
"a s cholarly explorat ion of space . "  His s c i ence advis o r , George 
Kis t iakowsky , cas t a baleful ey e over the d i f fu s e  NASA pro gram and 
o b s e rved .that the agency " d id not have a spac e program but o nly one t o
34 feed the many hungry N A S A  mouths . "
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J P L  i n  1 9 6 0  w a s  o n e  o f  tho s e  f e e l ing hungry . When the 
l aboratory had to t erm�nate nearly 100 p er s ons in May 1 9 6 0  and the 
Ranger bud get fell short , P icker ing s ent a plain t ive l e t t er t o  Glennan . 
Ranger r emind ed Pickering o f  Vega , " I t  app ears that once again we 
are saddled with an int erim proj ect wh ich will gradually s l ip to the 
p o int where i t  is no longer j us t i f ied and mus t  b e  canceled , "  he 
f r e t t ed . Mor e  than f ourt een months had • pas s ed s inc e JPL had 
conduc t e d  a space  exp e r imen t , he cont inued , and at leas t eleven months 
would elap s e  b e f o r e  the f i r s t  Ranger f l ight . JPL needed to carry 
proj e c t s  to comp l e t io n  to demons trat e , and to keep , i t s  c omp e t enc e . · 
"We wou ld l ike to bel ieve that we are d o ing something imp o r t ant f o r  the 
Nat ion , "  P ickering said , but it was hard to ma in t a in mo rale without 
support. f rom head quar t ers . Gl ennan exp lained the budgetary problems 
he faced , reassured P icker ing about the imp o r tance of Ranger , and 
cal led on him to provide the leader s h ip to maintain mo rale . 3 5 
But to P icker ing and many of his subord inat es , the mis for tunes 
of Ranger . s e emed too rep r e s ent a t ive of more general NASA woes . JPL 
conduc t ed i t s  res earch with one eye on the C o ld War c l o ck . " I t  is the 
U . S .  agains t Rus s ia , "  s a id P icker in g  in early 1 9 6 0 , " and i t s  mo s t  
imp o r t ant campaign i s  being f ought far out in the empty r each es o f  
s p a c e . "  But i f  one as ked " ' Do w e  now have a space p r o gram? ' t h e  answer 
mus t  be "No . " ' J ames Kill ian had l i s t ed space obj ec t ives as , in order , 
s c i ent i f i c , c ommerc ial , military , and human . P icke r ing f e l t  he had 
omit t ed the mo s t  important obj ec t ive : " t o  equal o r  exc eed the 
achievement s  o f  Rus s i a  in s pace . � The United S t a t e s  had t o  d o  this to
ma intain nat ional p r e s t ige , nor s o l e ly f o r  reas ons of p r id e , but for 
"very hard-headed ec onomic reasons ·• �·· 3 6 
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JPL thus clo sed its f i r s t  two years und er NASA. with much the
s ame feeling of frus t ration that it had ent ered the relat ioriship . Some 
ins t itut ional arrangemen t s  had b e en c la r i f ied , at least t emporarily , and 
aspec t s  of the lab o r a t o ry ' s  pro gram had b een s e t t led . But JPL s t il l  
thir s t e d  for t h e  f irs t maj or t r iumph i n  spac e , and i t  looked eagerly 
t o  the new admin i s t r a t ion in Washington t o  provide the imp etus it 
wan t ed . Ironically , as the laborat ory approached i t s  f i r s t  Ranger 
fl ight s in 1 9 6 1 , its own shor tcomings would . s o�n bec ome apparent , with
grave implicat ions for the space program and the health of the Jet 
Pro�uls ion Laboratory . 
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